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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The development of a Department of Defense (DoD) Product, whether it is an
Infrared Seeker or a handgun, will ultimately undergo the execution of a requirement
verification plan to make sure that the product being developed meets the requirements
that it was designed to meet. In DoD organizations, these plans are usually developed
and executed with cost and schedule as two significant variables. Technical risk is also
addressed but generally in the context of acknowledging that certain attributes have the
potential to impact cost, schedule, or mission. This risk posture or knowledge of the risk
items is tracked and managed via the respective organization’s risk management process.
While other influential pressure points are also critical (e.g. political pressure, expected
results, benefits) these do not typically play a major role in the verification plan
development. The execution of these plans can be very expensive and decision makers in
an effort to meet funding levels or schedule constraints are tempted to utilize verification
approaches that are less costly or less time consuming (e.g. less testing). While it makes
sense to verify some requirements via a specific verification approach (e.g. verifying the
size of a product by inspection or verifying the accuracy of a gun by firing it at a target),
1

verifying other requirements can be more flexible (verifying that a product meets an
acoustic environment by either analysis or by testing). This flexibility in verifying
requirements is the heart of this dissertation which specifically focuses on Department of
Defense products. The path that decision makers take can lead to substantial cost savings
or to results that may yield more questions than answers or both.

1.1 Requirement Verification.
Requirement verification is the assurance that a product meets the requirements
that it was designed to meet, “show[ing] proof of compliance with requirements—that the
product can meet each ‘shall’ statement as proven though performance of a test, analysis,
inspection, or demonstration” (NASA 2007a, 12). Modeling and simulation are also used
to verify requirements (typically considered a verification approach under the analysis
umbrella) but these models have to undergo their own verification and validation
programs before they can be used to verify requirements. Requirement verification is a
crucial part of a system engineering plan and one of the critical tasks of a program
manager, as is the case for the Department of Defense acquisition programs. “The
program manager should develop plans for system verification, and include these plans as
part of the approved functional baseline, following the [System Functional review] SFR.
The verification planning should consider all interface functional and performance
specifications” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a, 240).
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Many definitions exist and many types of “requirements” are defined in the
literature. The International Council of Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems
Engineering Handbook (International Council on Systems Engineering 2010) defines
requirements as “A statement that identifies a system, product or process characteristic or
constraint, which is unambiguous, clear, unique, consistent, stand alone (not grouped),
and verifiable, and is deemed necessary for stakeholder acceptability.” The DoD has a
similar definition but has a larger set of descriptors depending on the program, the phase
of the lifecycle and the acquisition activity. These range from statutory and regulatory to
Warfighter capability-based requirements to performance and functional requirements.
Performance and functional requirements, including interface requirements, are the basis
of the definition of requirements as used in this dissertation. A requirement is an attribute
that defines what a system (or a product) is to do. Attributes are defined as those
characteristics that define a product (e.g., weight, reliability, cost, etc.). In the context of
this dissertation, these requirements are those that are listed in the designed-to or build-to
specifications as defined in the functional, allocated, and product baselines of acquisition
programs. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines a functional baseline, in the
context of requirements, as those requirements that describe the functional and interface
characteristics of the overall product placed under configuration control, such as the
range of a missile (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a). The allocated baseline defines
the allocation of the product functions and performance requirements to the lower levels.
An example is the weight allocation to each of the components of the missile that
supports the range, given certain performance requirements like thrust. If the missile is
too heavy, the thrust produced will not be enough for the missile to reach the range
3

requirement. The product baseline describes the “functional and physical characteristics
of a configuration item” and placed under configuration control at the Critical Design
Review (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a, 199). These requirements, such as the
weight of the missile or the thrust requirement, are typically more robust (i.e., have less
variance).
The requirement verification process can be a very formal and disciplined
practice as outlined in various DoD Guidance documents (e.g., Defense Acquisition
Guidebook, MIL-STD-810, and DoD Systems Engineering Fundamentals). Verifying
requirements however, can range from informally verifying that a circuit meets an
electrical current at a laboratory to formally verifying the requirements (under
configuration control) of a missile systems capability to launch, communicate, seek,
acquire, and destroy a specific threat. At every level, program managers must select the
approach for verifying those requirements while also considering the attributes that
impact and are impacted by those decisions. An example is verifying the dimensions of
the inner barrel of a handgun. If the dimensions are not verified or are verified
incorrectly, the gun could explode harming the shooter, or the bullet could miss the target
deeming the gun inadequate.
Figure 1.1, Acquisition Phases, depicts that requirement verification is done
throughout the acquisition lifecycle. The bulk of the requirement verification is done in
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase where the product’s design is
finalized and the design configuration is formally brought under configuration control.
Configuration control of a product’s design entails an official way to maintain control of
4

the design so that any design changes that impact the product’s ability to meet the
requirements are brought up for change consideration to the Government for approval.
The Technology Development Phase supports the development, demonstration, and
selection of prototype designs, requirement refinements, and preliminary product designs.
The Materiel Solution Analysis Phase, The Production and Deployment Phase, and the
Operation and Support Phase have smaller roles in the conduct of requirement
verification plans but are still used to assess the potential materiel solution, verify
improvements found in test, evaluation, and initial production, and support operational
support requirements, respectively (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a).
Requirement verification importance is paramount because having a partially
verified product in the field could lead to negative consequences in terms of cost,
readiness, or even loss of life. Thus, the DoD provides guidance in the development of
requirement verification strategies and execution such as in U.S. Department of Defense
(2000, 2001b, and 2010). In addition, DoD guidance documents such as the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook provide detailed information that decision makers should use to
execute and be accountable for their individual programs/products. In regards to
requirement verification, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook addresses the different
types of reviews to conduct, baselines to have and place under configuration control, and
criteria to meet in support of their specific acquisition strategy and management
responsibilities (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a).

5

Figure 1.1, Acquisition Phases (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a, 218)

Verifying requirements can be accomplished by different means; however,
caution must be exercised since using an inappropriate approach may lead to inaccurate
or flawed verification. The most used approaches are:


Analysis. This is the use of data and/or the conduct of simulation to show
compliance (International Council on Systems Engineering (2010), U.S.
Department of Defense (1999 and 2010). An example is the conduct of thermal
analysis to show material property compliance.
6



Testing. This is the operation of an item during exposure to applicable
environment/condition using instrumentation and/or test equipment to show
compliance (U.S. Department of Defense (1999 and 2010). An example is firing
a gun and measuring (verifying) the exit velocity or firing a missile motor and
measuring (verifying) the thrust level.



Inspection. This is an examination of the item or documentation to show
compliance (International Council on Systems Engineering (2010), U.S.
Department of Defense (1999 and 2010). An example is measuring the inner
diameter of the gun barrel.



Demonstration. This is operation of an item showing compliance with no or
minimum instrumentation or test equipment (International Council on Systems
Engineering (2010), U.S. Department of Defense (1999 and 2010). An example
is firing a gun to demonstrate operation.
The verification approach varies depending on the product, requirement,

operational concept, and other factors. Some requirements can only be verified via one
approach (e.g., exit velocity of a bullet as a gun is fired). Others rely on documented
guidance such as in U.S. Department of Defense (2000), where the types of approaches,
durations, and levels are stated. This standard provides guidelines and methodology to
use in tailoring environmental requirements to specific products and applications. It
defines environmental stress sequences, durations, and levels of materiel life cycles.
Decision makers and/or testers use this guidance to select approaches to use to verify
certain requirements. It is conceivable that some requirements could be verified via a test
7

or via analysis. This depends, however, on the product and its maturity, design
complexity, vendor base and other characteristics. Specific product documents defining
requirement verification strategies are common and usually leave the approach selection
vague for the System/Chief Engineer or decision maker. For example, U.S. Air Force
Space Command (2008, 35) states a “test or analysis shall be performed to demonstrate
that a battery can withstand the acoustic environment expected during launch …” In the
Aerospace report (Welch 2010, 82), a number of requirements have the flexibility to be
verified by “analysis or test[ing] to verify … random vibration, acoustic, shock, thermal,
vacuum, electromagnetic ….”

1.2 Requirement Verification Decision.
The development of verification plans occur early in the developmental cycle
where uncertainty exists about the maturity of the product, risk, verification cost, funding,
future outcomes and schedule. Nevertheless, these plans have to address what
approaches to utilize to verify each of the requirements. In developing these plans,
historical data and technical expertise are used to construct strategies that will address
each of the verification requirements. As stated above, the majority of the requirements
have a definite verification approach that should be used, but there are some that are
selected by the decision maker. For these requirements, not much emphasis is placed on
the overall value of verifying a requirement using one approach versus another, other
than from a cost or schedule stand point, as long as the requirement is “verified.” Since
the execution of these requirement verification plans can be expensive and time
8

consuming, decision makers are pressured into either reducing the verification approach
or pursuing a approach that may not yield the most confident results (e.g., Hubble Space
Telescope incident where the complete system was not tested prior to launch (Bahill
2005).
Decision makers, however, are not only aware of the system engineering process
that they must/should follow in terms of verification and the budget and schedule
constraints that their programs are under, they are also aware of the following elements
that impact and are impacted by the decisions they make:


When the product is tested, failures will likely occur. Failures are not always bad,
as portrayed by news media or the countless GAO reports that critique the
different DoD programs that exhibit those failures. Failures are an opportunity to
learn and advance understanding of product performance.



Rework/repair/retesting will occur. For most developmental programs in the
early stages, decisions to rework or repair the failure mode and retest to make sure
it is corrected is a given.



The decision maker is cognizant of the product’s expected condition going into a
verification program based on a variety of factors, including the Technology
Readiness Level of the product, the vendor’s experience, and the quality standards
used.



Good products generate benefits. The development of products is done to yield a
certain benefit. For the DoD, it may be to defend a city against a missile threat
from a rogue country, to provide an offensive weapon that can destroy a target, or
9

to protect a soldier from harm. These benefits could be in the form of political
posture, deterrence, costs associated with the consequences of not achieving the
products objectives, or other variables. Having good products in the field will
capitalize on these benefits and having bad products in the field may minimize or
negate the benefits and may cause additional costs and negative consequences.
For a private industry the benefit may be profit, product recognition, or company
pride and visibility.


Subjecting a product to a specific test to verify a functional requirement will not
only test the product’s functional and operational requirements, but it will also
test the interfaces of the products components. Conducting an analysis may
verify that the interfaces do not interfere with the adjoining parts or that thermal
properties are adequate but testing may identify issues/problems (interplay) that
an analysis may not find, especially during environmental exposure.



Testing and Analysis can pass bad products/designs and fail good
products/designs. Thus, for any test or analysis with binary results (pass/fail), a
passed product will either be good or bad and a failed product will either be good
or bad with a certain statistical measure.

1.3 Problem Statement or Research Question.
Verification approach selection can be an appealing option to decision makers
when they are pressured into reducing cost and/or schedule. Substituting the verification
of a requirement from a test to an analysis may be initially cost and schedule favorable,
10

but will it be the most appropriate decision when other factors/attributes are taken into
account, such as the probability that testing the article may yield a more complete
verification than by analysis? How about if the product passes the analysis but still has a
probability of failing in the field? What are the consequences associated with a failure in
the field? These questions, elements, and other variables (e.g., political pressure,
environmental concerns, expected profit, deterrence, and uncertainty) play a less
influential role in the decision but can have a substantial impact on the program. While a
holistic view of all of the pressure points that would impact the decision should be made,
more often than not, decisions are driven by cost or schedule pressures. The research
question to be addressed by this dissertation is how can the decision maker adequately
choose between a test or an analysis within the context of addressing cost, schedule,
verification compliance assuredness, known conditions, and uncertainty? The research
outlined in this dissertation seeks to develop a methodology to help the decision maker in
deciding when to verify a requirement by testing and when to verify by analysis.

1.4 Research Topic
This research seeks to develop a holistic methodology that can assist the DoD
decision makers in choosing the most appropriate requirement verification strategy for
those requirements that can be verified by either test or analysis. The methodology will
incorporate cost and schedule impacts, as well as other influential variables such as
uncertainty, benefit, and value. While this methodology is focused on DoD requirement
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verification decisions addressing test or analysis, it can be applied to a wide range of
decisions.

1.5 Significance of the Research
The contributions of this research are both specific and wide ranging. By
specific, it is meant to address the specific topic of deciding whether to use analysis or
test to verify certain requirements. The wide-ranging front implies applying the
methodology to a broad range of decisions. On both fronts, the methodology will
minimize subjective assessments in decision making; minimize the cost associated with
making incorrect or not the-most-preferred decision; establish a DoD methodology that
will enhance decision making across the Department, not just in requirement verification
decisions; provide higher program confidence; and provide an overall understanding of
the ramifications of making decisions. The approach will provide decision makers a
methodology to use in addressing verification strategies as well as in other decisions that
can be treated similarly (contract actions, analysis of alternatives, benefit-cost-analysis,
product procurement, design options) and will expand the Value-centric philosophy as a
positive contributor in the Industrial & Systems Engineering and Engineering
Management (ISEEM) discipline.
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1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
The research began with defining requirements verification, why it is done, when
it is done (phases in the life cycle), the types of approaches used, and the challenge that
decision makes face in deciding whether to test or verify requirements. These items are
addressed in Chapter 1, Introduction. In addition, Chapter 1 reviews how the dilemma
can be answered as well as the significance of this research and application of the
methodology developed in this study.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature related to requirements verification.
To make sure that this dilemma has not been answered in the past by the DoD or nonDoD entities, a wide range of DoD Guidance and Requirement documents (from the
Defense Acquisition Guidebook and DoD 5000 to specific product standards) were
researched focusing first on requirements verification methodology and then on how
DoD makes decisions. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
guidance and requirements documents were also researched as well as International
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) and limited industry standards/documents
due to the proprietary nature of their documents. The oil and gas industry and the
pharmaceutical industry were also researched to establish an understanding on the
methods, techniques, and tools they use to make decisions. In addition, specific
verification methodologies and models were researched to ascertain their applicability.
Chapter 3 will address the current methodology used by the DoD to verify
requirements. The chapter will also address the methodology used by the DoD to make
decisions. The latter could be used by decision makers in choosing between test or
13

analysis but as discussed in Chapter 3, research has shown that decision making guidance
is not part of the requirements verification guidance. This chapter will also discuss what
is missing with the current methodology and why a comprehensive methodology, like the
one that this research is seeking, is needed.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the developed methodology. This
chapter defines the methodology and its applicability to requirements verification
decisions. The chapter will define the approach and the process used to yield a holistic
methodology to deal with requirements verification approach (test or analysis) decision
making under uncertainty. It will also discuss how this methodology can be tailored to a
wide range of decisions. Chapter 4 will also present two examples used to illustrate the
methodology.
Chapter 5 presents a summary and conclusions of the research as well as
articulating recommended areas for future study.

14

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Requirement verification, as a critical function of the systems engineering
process, is fundamentally unchanged since the inception of product development. A need
exists, requirements are defined, the product is designed, developed, built, and these
requirements are verified to make sure that the product was built, developed, and
designed correctly and that the requirements were defined properly for the product to
meet the need. Whether it is a Government product or a commercial item, the
fundamental course of action is similar; a product needs to be verified to a set of
requirements. The question is how are those requirements going to be verified?
This chapter will address current approaches to requirement verification,
specifically as it pertains to those requirements that can be verified by either test or
analysis. The chapter will also address what guidance or policy exist that allows
systems/chief engineers, program managers or decision makers choose what verification
method (test or analysis) to use that would not only verify the requirement but also
provide the best value to the stakeholders.

15

In an effort to answer the question of requirement verification methodology, this
chapter reviews existing Department of Defense requirement verification guidance,
specifically focusing on the decision-making logic of choosing between test and analysis.
Next, DoD decision-making guidance or required policy will be addressed from a point
of view of the particular guidance or policy that decisions makers use to make decisions
that could also be used to address the question of choosing a method for verification.
The guidance provided by NASA will also be addressed in terms of the same logic,
requirement verification and decision making. The oil and gas industry and the
pharmaceutical industry will be discussed in terms of how decisions are made not
necessarily how requirements are verified. The similarity between these industries and
DoD is that these industries produce products (drugs or oil/gas) just like the DoD (tanks,
missiles) and decisions are made that impact the results of the products, whether it is
verifying that the products meet the needs or whether to pursue the product development
(e.g., drug to market). The logic used to assess these critical decisions may have
important applications in the DoD, specifically in determining what verification method
to use. Lastly, innovative requirement verification models and methods will be addressed
as well as a promising theoretical methodology that will be used to support and construct
the methodology addressed in this dissertation.

2.1 Department of Defense Guidance
The Department of Defense contains mandates, guidance documents, procedures,
and the like to require and guide personnel in the conduct of acquisition responsibilities.
16

The DoD 5000 series documents are overarching regulatory documents that “provide
management principles and mandatory policies and procedures for managing all
acquisition programs” (U.S. Department of Defense 2007a, 4). While these documents
do not specifically address selection of a requirement verification method , DoDI 5000.2 ,
which is part of the DoD 5000 series, does point to the incorporation of a systems
engineering (SE) discipline throughout the entire acquisition life cycle. In addition, test
and evaluation guidance within the document provides required planning, events and
criteria to follow regarding acquisition phases and programs in which demonstration of
capabilities, effectiveness, and other attributes are addressed. These top level documents
flow down requirements to guidance documents such as the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook for product/program implementation (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a).
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a)
provides best practice guidance (principles and procedures) to complement policy
documents (e.g., DoD 5000). The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is an excellent
reference source to assist management and others in executing their respective
responsibilities. The guidelines, processes, and overall content of the document are used
to tailor the needs of the specific program. The Guidebook and the guidance therein
address requirement verification as part of the system engineering process and provide
processes, reviews, and terminology on the need to conduct these reviews at certain
milestones and life cycle phases. Specific program reviews such as the System
Verification Review is highlighted as critical for the continuation to the low-rate initial
production and full rate production.
17

While the Guidebook provides enough detail to plan a requirement verification
program, it does not specifically provide guidance on verification method selection in
terms of analysis or testing. It does describe the four typical verification methods as
defined in Chapter 1of this dissertation and it even addresses the use of testing when “an
acceptable level of confidence cannot be established by other verification methods, or if
testing can be shown to be the most cost effective method.” The cost comparison is
relatively easy to obtain but defining the “acceptable level of confidence” is more
challenging (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, 216).
Part of the systems engineering process is to define how requirement verification
is going to be accomplished at the time the actual requirements are defined. MILHDBK-520 contains guidance for the preparation of a systems requirements document
(SRD). The SRD provides a link between the warfighter and the acquisition program and
it is a critical part of the program’s SE process. The SRD basically translates the
warfighter needs (requirements) into acquisition requirements. The SRD provides
guidance on how to capture and translate the requirements and address verification
method selection from a top guidance level. It emphasizes requirement definition as
critical as well as the ability for that requirement to be verifiable (U.S. Department of
Defense 2010). It does not, however, address the logic behind verification method
selection for requirements that have a choice (test or analysis).
The SE process states that requirement allocation should be done from a top-down
approach just like the development of an SRD, translating warfighter requirements to
acquisition requirements. The system engineering process, as it relates to verification, is
18

defined throughout the DoD guidance and policy documents (U.S. Department of
Defense 2010, U.S Air Force 2006, U.S Air Force Space Command 2013, U.S.
Department of the Army 2006, U.S. Air Force 2004, and U.S. Air Force 2009, as well as
documents written and taught by the Defense Acquisition University (U.S. Department of
Defense 2001b and 2005). These and other documents define what verification is, the
processes, phases, reviews, and even responsibilities of different levels from the program
manager to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). These guidance
documents, however, do not address the selection of test or analysis when both are
suitable for verification.
Other more detailed guidance, such as Military Standard (MIL-STD) – 810,
define the types of verification methods to use, the sequence, durations, and levels for
different environmental requirements of materiel life cycles. It is a widely used
document to plan and develop verification plans throughout DoD tailored to the specific
program. Military Standard (MIL-STD) - 464 is also a widely used environmental
document addressing electromagnetic environmental effects on systems. These
environmental guidance documents, like the others, however, do not define the decision
logic that addresses test or analysis. Program manager or decision makers rely on
subjective assessments to decide between verification methods based on the “degree of
confidence in the result of the particular method, technical appropriateness, associated
costs, and availability of assets” (U.S. Department of Defense 1997, 28). This logic is the
right step in addressing the question of how to select a verification method but the
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selection is still left to a subjective decision, and this guidance does not address which
method provides the most value for the program.
The guidance and policy mentioned so far is followed by DoD programs and
reflected in specific product specifications and standards, such as in the Department of
Defense Standard Practice Product Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage,
and Space Vehicles which defines the process to develop and manage verification
requirements for launch equipment (U.S. Department of Defense 1999). The Space and
Missile Systems Standard Lithium-Ion Battery for Launch Vehicle Applications document
provides requirements and guidelines for the development and testing of lithium-ion cells
and batteries used in launch vehicle applications (U.S. Air Force Space Command 2008).
Another specific product specification, the Aeronautical Design Standard Practice Radar
System Airworthiness Qualification and Verification Requirements, defines the
verification methods and qualification requirements for radar systems installed on U.S.
Army aircraft (U.S. Department of Defense 2001a). These documents call out the
verification methods that are necessary to verify different requirements from
electromagnetic interference testing verifying that the radar system meets all of the EMI
requirements to flight vibration where the analysis of the resonant modes of the radar
system or testing the airframe may be used to verify that the flight vibration levels do not
affect the performance of the radar system. These standards, however, do not address
how to choose between test or analysis.
As illustrated in the previous discussion, guidance and policy exist that address
verification needs in terms of objectives, processes, methods, approvals, reporting, and
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documenting, all in the context of following the SE process. This guidance, however,
does not provide a means for selecting test or analysis as a verification method.
In terms of DoD decision methodology and guidance that could be used to
address requirement verification method selection, the U.S. Department of Defense
(2011a) highlights certain “tools” that are used to evaluate alternatives or options for
different milestones, reviews, or situations. The two most used are the business case
analysis (BCA) used to support major product decisions and the analysis of alternatives
(AoA), which is required to be developed and conducted prior to the Technology
Development Phase. Other program decision methods addressed are in terms of
economic and decision analysis/trade studies. These, as well as the BCA and AoA
methodologies are addressed in different documents used by acquisition professionals to
conduct their managerial responsibilities. However, as shown in the next paragraphs,
these methods are centered on balancing cost and performance in choosing the best
alternative.
The business case analysis guidance focuses on cost as an independent variable
and uses a scoring/weight methodology to assess benefits. It is the recommended method
to use in formal economic analysis of Government programs (United States Office of
Management and Budget 1992). Policy and guidance documents such as the Department
of Defense Instruction, Economic Analysis for Decision Making (U.S. Department of
Defense 1995), the Department of Defense Product Support Business Case Analysis
Guidebook (U.S. Department of Defense 2011b), and the Benefit Analysis Guidebook
(U.S. Department of Defense 2007b) delineate the benefits of conducting the BCAs, the
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process used, why it is important to conduct them, and when to conduct them. These
documents are indirect flow downs of the DAG and DoD 5000 regulations and provide
acquisition professionals with the information needed to conduct the BCA’s tailored to
their respective situations and programs.
The DoD Instruction, Economic Analysis for Decision Making document, for
example, implements policy for “conducting cost-effective economic analysis for
evaluating the cost and benefits of investment alternatives” (U.S. Department of Defense
1995, 1). Economic analysis, as defined in this document, is an approach to address the
decision of choosing the best method for the given resources that will provide a given
objective. Guidance within the document states that economic analysis addressing cost
and benefits should be done when making decisions. However, implementation of this
guidance falls short in defining what benefits are and how to calculate them. The United
States Office of Management and Budget (1992) provides guidance for the conduct of
benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analysis as well as specific guidance on using discount
rates in those analyses. While the document is not policy, the guidelines must be
followed in OMB analysis submissions. OMB submissions are not the only forum where
BCA’s are used, however. The guidelines depicted in this circular also apply to
“…analysis used to support Government decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs
or projects which would result in a series of measureable benefits or costs …” (United
States Office of Management and Budget 1992, 3).
BCAs as outlined in this and other policy documents flow down to various
decision situations such as contractual solicitations. The Benefit Analysis Guidebook for
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example, provides guidelines to determine benefits based on cost savings, quality
improvements, reductions in acquisition cycle times, and other elements. This
methodology assists the decision makers or their personnel in performing benefit analysis
before pursuing acquisition strategies (U.S. Department of Defense 2007b).
The Department of Defense Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook
U.S. Department of Defense 2011a) is used extensively by the Air Force and referenced
by the other departments and agencies, provides a uniformly consistent methodology of
value-based decision making dictated by one of the recommendations from the Weapon
System Acquisition Reform: Product Support Assessment (WSAR-PSA). The WSARPSA approved and signed by Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics was a result of a study conducted by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness to “continue to
improve product support, with a specific focus on increasing readiness and enabling
better cost control” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011b, 2). This document attempts to
standardize the DoD BCA process. It defines a BCA as “a documented, objective, value
analysis” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011b, 5) that addresses costs, benefits, and risks
and provides guidance to PMs in defining and deciding on strategies that yield the
“optimal balance between warfighter capabilities and affordability” (U.S. Department of
Defense 2011b, 5). The document addresses and defines the inclusion of benefits
(calculated quantitatively) in the analysis and provides examples of types of benefits to
include such as “financial benefits or cost per flight-hour” (U.S. Department of Defense
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2011b, 18). Qualitative benefits should also be included, as delineated in the guidance,
by the use of a scoring methodology rather than quantitatively converted.
The overall BCA methodology recommended by this and similar guidance
documents is essentially the conduct of an analysis balancing cost and benefits utilizing
economic analysis tools like net present value. The BCA methodology further addresses
qualitative benefits (such as morale or data rights) by ranking them by priority. It
recommends a team approach for agreement on the criteria and final evaluation to make
sure the results are realistic. Best value is addressed from the perspective of the balance
of performance and cost. The BCA methodology guidance also advocates the use of a
BCA to assist in decision making across “all applications” of the product such as design
alternatives, asset disposition, or vendor acquisitions.
This guidance when addressing decision making using BCAs is similar in that
cost is used as an independent measure and assessed against an “effectiveness” value
calculated using a weighting/scoring scheme. The Department of Defense Product
Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook (U.S. Department of Defense 2011b) begins
to clearly address a holistic view of decision making, the use of value-centric
methodology, and a standard way at approaching decision making. The introduction and
acknowledgement of a value-centric approach in decision making is a positive step
towards addressing those things that affect decisions and those things that are affected by
decisions. However, when it comes to implementation and specific execution guidance,
uncertainty is only addressed with sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis is emphasized
as a way to judge whether the results are skewed or unrealistic. The uncertainty
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surrounding the expected paths/outcomes that strategies may take or the expected results
out of those paths and how these may affect the decision is not addressed. A
consolidated comprehensive way to view each option or alternative from a best value
standpoint is also not addressed. While the methodology described in these documents is
not wrong, it does leave decision makers with an incomplete picture of the decision
situation.
The other widely used decision analysis method is the analysis of alternatives
which must be submitted to the Milestone Decision Authority for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs at Milestone A (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a). Milestone A
is the official milestone that assesses readiness into the next stage (Technology
Demonstration) of the acquisition life cycle. The AoAs are defined by the DAG as “an
analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost of
alternatives that satisfy established capability needs” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011a,
114).
The AoA guidance referred to in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2011a) is
further decomposed in various documents like the Air Force Materiel Command AoA
Handbook (U.S. Air Force Materiel Command 2013). This handbook provides a detailed
explanation of what an AoA should encompass, the methodology, and format. The
methodology focuses on comparing the effectiveness of the alternatives based on military
worth, where military worth is a subjective indication of the worth of an alternative as a
function of cost, risk, and performance capability. This methodology emphasizes
providing performance capability versus cost to decision makers for their own subjective
25

interpretation and decision. It does not, however, take into account the probability and
consequences associated with those capabilities not being able to be met from a cost and
consequences standpoint.
Besides economic analytical guidelines, other disciplines and methodologies exist
in addressing decision logic. DoD utilizes a Value Engineering Program where it
provides guidelines for the conduct of value engineering in acquisition products/programs
with the objective of reducing cost while maintaining a necessary level of performance
(U.S. Department of Defense 1986). This guidance, however, focuses on values as a
function of cost minimization for all facets of the Government. It addresses value in
terms of qualitative and quantitative attributes that define the best value of a program or
alternative. The term “best value” is defined as the “best relationship between worth and
cost,” where worth is defined as “the least expenditure required to provide an essential
function and is established by comparison” (U.S. Department of Defense 1986, 11).
The value engineering methodology is also carried to the acquisition of goods and
services where source selection conduct is performed. Evaluations are based on technical
ratings, past performance, and cost with selection based on the “best value to the
government” (U.S. Department of Defense 2011c, 4). While this methodology has made
great strides in addressing the other attributes that contribute to the value of an alternative
in a decision, it does not address the probabilities or consequences associated with not
meeting these attributes.
In summary, the DoD addresses requirement verification in various guidance
documents and policies that are flowed down to the particular program specifications.
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Each program tailors that guidance to their specific program needs. While the policy and
guidance provides methods to use in verifying requirements, it does not address
requirements that have a choice between test or analysis. Decision making policy and
guidance that could be used to answer the test or analysis question lacks a holistic view
encompassing critical attributes like uncertainty, expected results (pass or fail, sensitivity
and specificity, rework), consequences and value.

2.2 NASA Guidance
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is similar to the
DoD, specifically in product requirement verification needs where a product (missile or
human space craft) is verified to ensure that requirements are met. Policy and guidance is
provided within NASA via specific handbooks and directives like the NASA Systems
Engineering Handbook (NASA 2007a). This Handbook provides top level guidance and
information for SE practices. It is similar to DoD systems engineering documentation as
it delineates the SE process, activities, phases, and processes. The NASA NPR 7123
(NASA 2007b), is a mandatory document that addresses the implementation of SE
practices and establishes a set of technical processes and requirements at the agency
level. These and other industry standards like the INCOSE’s Systems Engineering
Handbook, address verification as a critical part of the SE process and define methods,
procedures, and processes to use in verifying requirements (International Council on
Systems Engineering 2010). However, the logic behind how to decide between a test or
an analysis to verify requirements that may be verified by either testing or analysis is not
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specifically addressed. Other product specific requirement verification guidance like
NASA/SP-2011-6128 (NASA 2011) which defines the requirement assurance verification
process also mimics the previous documents in supporting and following the SE process.
However, this document addresses verification method selection by referencing the
systems engineer to “choose the best verification method to verify each requirement”
(NASA 2011, 1).
The guidance, policy actions, and mandates at NASA are allocated and
incorporated into specific program documentation, as in DoD. NASA SSP 30559 Rev C
(NASA 2000) provide “both structural design and verification requirements to assure that
both are considered in the specification of detailed requirements for a component of the
Space Station Program flight hardware” (NASA 2000, 1). NASA’s subjectivity in
verification method selection, when there is a choice, is similar to that of DoD where no
guidance exists. NASA does however contain decision making guidance that addresses
attributes that affect decisions. This guidance, however, is not part of the verificationmaking guidance or policy.

2.3 Oil and Gas Exploration Industry
The oil and gas exploration industry was researched since it has a similar need for
requirement verification and a decision-making logic that the DoD might be able to use.
Both have requirements that have to be verified. The DoD may verify the acoustic level
of a certain product where the oil and gas industry may verify the oil or gas reserves in a
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particular area. Several methods are available to help decision makers evaluate/select
opportunities that can be used and are used by these industries. Coopersmith et al. (2000)
looked into what is available and found that several methods such as “Discounted cashflow analysis, net present value, Monte Carlo simulation, portfolio theory, and decision
tree analysis, and preference theory” are used. Other researchers (Salleh, Rosales, and
Mota, 2007) have done more specific research and found that some companies determine
the geological framework of the area (i.e., types of soil, rocks, and other physical
evidence) and compare it to existing data sources which provides discovery probabilities.
Bayesian statistics and decision trees are used to point out “the most appropriate next
steps for an improved, less risky exploratory effort” (Salleh, Rosales, and Mota 2007).
Risk is inherent in everything the DoD does and it is included in assessments and
decision making at every level, whether required and formally submitted in a
report/briefing or not. Risk assessment is also part of the oil and gas exploration industry
decision making as McMillen, Magaw, and Carovillano (2001) point out. Risk-based
decision-making methods used in these industries take into consideration site risk
assessments regarding humans and the environment. This assessment is compared to the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) guidelines such as the soil
screening levels “derived from equations combining exposure assumptions with EPA
toxicity data” (United States Environmental Protection Agency 1996, p. 5) to address the
risk of exploring a particular site.
A number of studies have also been conducted to address the question of decision
making methodology used by the oil and gas industry. Bailey et al. (2000) report that
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research done at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland of 20 companies active in the
North Sea showed a mix of methods. Discounted cash flow analysis is the most “widelyused investment appraisal tool” (Bailey et al. 2000, 22). Probabilistic analysis tools like
Monte Carlo simulation were used to determine the recoverable reserves. They also
found that seventy-five percent of the sample used decision trees as part of the decision
process.
Another study of 221 U.S. oil and gas companies found that “companies prefer
simple and easy to use methodologies in evaluation and selection of projects” (Razak
2001, 35). Simple economic tools (e.g., net present value, payback period, and internal
rate of return) were favored for economic analysis. Financial and political risk
assessments were mostly made using subjective assessments and non-typical financial
methods (e.g., decision theory and simulation) were not widely used.
This review of the literature, specifically the insight provided by these studies,
indicates that there is no single guiding method used to make decisions. It is specific to
the situation but economic tools are preferred, which makes sense as these companies are
driven by profit. The use of probabilistic tools/methods is not as prevalent, especially as
reported in the study of the 221 U.S. oil gas companies (Razak 2001). The probabilistic
tools/methods used by these oil and gas industries provides insight into what methods the
DoD could use to make decisions, specifically deciding between test and analysis to
verify requirements.
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2.4 Pharmaceutical Industry
The literature on decision-making in the pharmaceutical industry was also
reviewed. The specific question was what method is used to make decisions? The
rationale for researching the pharmaceutical industry is that it also has a parallel to the oil
and gas industry and the DoD requirement verification decision making. The DoD has to
verify products and decide which to carry forward, while the pharmaceutical industry
must verify drugs prior to market release or to obtain the Food and Drug Administration
approval. Both have uncertainty associated with pursuing a course of action and both
have costs, risks, benefits, and consequences.
A review of the research literature revealed that several methods are used to help
decision makers evaluate and select investment opportunities, these include net present
value, consumer theory based approaches that account for health care provider
preferences (Kleczyk 2011), return on investment (Bates 2008). Lopert (2009) indicates
that an Australian Government program uses evidence-based decision making (i.e.,
higher cost medicine must show significant improvement before a subsidy is
recommended).
Several studies have been done regarding decision-making by pharmaceutical
companies which tend to agree with the aforementioned results. Hartmann and Hassan
(2006) surveyed 28 international research-based pharmaceutical and biotech companies
in Europe, Japan, and the USA and the results indicated a preference based on the phase
of the program the developed drug was in. During the research phase, NPV-based
approaches were most preferred. Real option analysis was mostly used in clinical phases.
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Risk analysis (i.e., decision trees, scenario, and sensitivity analysis) was used in all
phases.
Cowlrick et al. (2011) surveyed pharmaceutical/allied health-care companies (14
countries/52 respondents). The survey assessed what factors influenced decisions (i.e.,
work experience, functional role, education, or their perceived entrepreneurial character)
and how they conducted the final determination of a path forward. Results found that
during the drug discovery and development process probabilistic decision models are
used but “personal bias influenced the final judgments.”
Leung et al. (2012) surveyed 26 organizations representing health plans,
pharmacy companies, Medicaid agencies, and drug companies. The survey looked at the
process “that examines the short- and long term health and economic outcomes of
adopting biologic and pharmaceutical products” (Leung et al. 2012, 257). Results
indicate that the processes (e.g., peer-reviews and best value assessments) and the
evidence (e.g., journals and effectiveness studies) used to make decisions vary
significantly. For example, best-value assessments (i.e., in terms of the customers and
the organizations) are used to make decisions but the influence that cost has in the
assessment is dependent on the organization and by the therapeutic area. Subjective
assessments (i.e., expert opinion) are used when evidence is inconsistent or lacking. The
use of analytic models to compare drug treatments was minimal when evidence was
insufficient.
As with the oil and gas industry, economic analysis tools were widely used and
even preferred by the pharmaceutical companies to assess economic analysis. While the
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oil and gas industry relies on probabilistic methods to assess product outcomes, the
pharmaceutical industry relies more on subjective assessments by knowledgeable
individuals and researchers to make decisions.

2.5 Other Methodologies
Other requirement verification methodologies were researched to ascertain what
is available and what is being used to address the question of selecting a verification
method. The research findings can be segregated into four categories; optimization of a
verification activity performance based on cost and risk; verification performance
consequence based on cost; the use of verification stopping criteria, and a value-centric
methodology that was researched for an application and used in the construct of the
methodology defined in this dissertation.
Optimizing the performance of a verification activity based on cost and risk were
addressed by a number of authors. Barad and Engel (2006) developed a model that
utilized activities in a verification, validation, and testing (VVT) strategy with associated
costs and risks. The model defines a set of activities for a particular VVT strategy.
Activities can be performed, not performed, or partially performed and each has an
associated cost as a function of a percentage of activity performance (how much of the
activity is done, not the performance outcome). These activities have costs identified for
the performance of the activity. Each of the activities also defines a risk (i.e., an impact
probability that if that activity is not performed, it will yield a negative consequence).
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The negative consequence is in terms of a cost which is also defined. Risk is measured as
a function of the percentage of the activity performed times the impact cost of the activity
on the life cycle with its associated probability. This cost is dependent on the amount of
the activity completed. If the activity is performed fully, there is no risk impact but there
is a maximum cost. The optimization entails defining an optimal strategy that yields
what activities need to be done, not done, or partially done as a function of cost and risk.
While the model provides an interesting way of deriving an optimal VVT strategy, it does
not address the results of the verification activities, the uncertainty associated with
passing/failing those activities, rework, nor benefits.
Shabi and Reich (2012) also developed a model that maximizes quality (i.e., how
well the method support VVT activity) subject to cost (i.e., method cost) or risk
constraints. This methodology is very applicable to the dissertation as it provides a
methodology to address requirement verification, validation and testing using decision
logic. The model tries to structure the decision process by optimizing quality as a
function of cost and risk constraints. The quality factor is an assessment by the program
manager on “how well the incorporation of the particular VVT method supports the VVT
activity in order to satisfy customer requirements” (Shabi and Reich 2012, 437). The
program manager also determines the weight (importance) of the activity and the risk.
These subjective inputs are used in various matrices to determine the interactions of using
a method or a combination of methods to satisfy the requirements. The output is a set of
all possible combinations with data from the different matrices to yield Pareto optimal
results in terms of quality, cost, risk factors and recommended verification methods for
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each of the activities. This matrix can be used by program managers to conduct tradeoffs
between cost, risk, and quality. Data for these three attributes are based on a numeric list
of assigned levels (e.g., one for “verification method not applicable” to three “best effect
quality value”). Other numeric assignments are used for the remainder of the attributes
and incorporated in the matrices. While cost is shown in the example as a ranking
between 0 and 15, actual costs could be used directly, although they may need to be
normalized.
The recommended verification methods are not traded off with each other, it is up
to the managers to decide which one to use (i.e., a subjective assessment or based on
experts recommendations). The model and methodology is a useful tool to provide
decision makers with choices and based on their subjective decisions, expertise or
attribute limitations (e.g., cost), a selection can be made from a list of many. The
model/methodology does not address which of the recommended verification methods to
use for a given set of attribute values nor does it address the benefits associated with
selecting one set of methods to verify a set of requirements. It also does not address the
uncertainty associated with method results in terms of flawed test results or rework or
value.
Hoppe, Engel, and Shachar (2007) and Hoppe and Honour (2004) describe a VVT
model that uses operators to select VVT activities, methods, cost, schedule, product
quality gains, and risk for a given alternative. The model was incorporated into a
European project (SYSTEST Project) with 8 European companies. Monte Carlo
simulation was used to address input uncertainty resulting in an optimal VVT strategy
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with respect to cost, duration, and resulting product quality. This project represented a
diverse representation of industries (aircraft, automobile, food packaging, and steel) and
data resulting from pilot studies indicated that the SYSTEST product “improved the
process and quality” and achieved cost savings.
The second category, verification performance consequence based on cost, was
addressed by Berglund (2006) where he advocates managing system risk by the use of a
looping life-cycle model with toll gates. Each toll gate addresses a decision criteria based
on a model that balances the cost of the quality assurance (QA) activities to the expected
cost of proceeding to the next stage taking into account the probabilities of passing
flawed hardware and its consequences. The methodology is based on the risk assessment
of the project’s QA over its life cycle and the risk of not verifying a parameter(s) or not
verifying it properly and the QA being propagated from life cycle stage to stage. This
risk is in the form of a monetary value (consequence in terms of cost). A set of equations
that use the risk (probability) of delivering a flawed product, the consequences (cost) of
that product being delivered, and the cost of the method. The comparison is based on the
sum of the cost of the verification method plus the cost (risk of delivering a flawed
product times the consequences (cost) of delivering that cost product). The different
method costs are compared to each other and the lowest cost may be selected by the
decision maker. This methodology is very similar to the proposed methodology as it uses
probability of having passed a bad product, the risk associated with that path, costs of the
method, and the consequences in terms of cost (negative benefits). Berglund’s
methodology, however does not address the corresponding probabilities of a product
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having passed, the benefits of that product, the rework scenarios, the uncertainties
associated with the respective attributes (e.g., costs, risks)
The use of stopping criteria to manage verification testing was addressed by
Boumen et al. (2008). The methodology introduced imperfect testing, risk, test time, and
test cost. This methodology is very similar to the proposed methodology but their
emphasis is on putting limits based on risk, cost, or other specified value. If a test
sequence reaches a certain limit then the decision is made not to pursue any further
testing because that limit may be the point where it would be more beneficial to repair an
item in the field than to spend any more time and cost to keep testing.
The three categories addressed so far focused on requirement verification
methodologies. The last category is the value-centric methodology that was not
necessarily developed to address requirement verification but it is very applicable and
forms the basis of the methodology developed and discussed in this dissertation.
The term value-centric has been used in many forums and situations throughout
non-DoD organizations and to a limited basis within DoD. To understand what these
terms are, first the term value needs to be defined. Value, as applicable to this topic and
as defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (Dictionary 2013a) and the Oxford
Dictionary (Dictionary 2013b), is the “the monetary worth of something” or the “relative
worth, utility, or importance.” Value, then, is a numerical measure that reflects the
“worth” or preference of something over something else. The numerical measure needs
to include those things that add to or detract from what is being assessed or evaluated.
That numerical measure is compared to the value (numerical measure) of something else
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and the one with the highest value is the preferred approach. An example would be
deciding between two grocery stores for purchasing a hand full of groceries. Store A is
close to home and has short checkout lines, but the prices are usually high. Store B is
farther away, usually has longer checkout lines, but the prices are usually lower. How
would one make such a decision? Is the money expected to be saved in the large grocery
store worth the time and frustration of the long checkout lines and longer driving
distance? How about if there is traffic or perhaps if one gets into an accident or the car
has a flat tire, or….? How about if the small grocery store does not have the item or the
size that is wanted? Would you still have to go to the large grocery store to pick that one
item? The decision has to do with how one perceives value. Is time more valuable than
money? How about the long checkout lines and the chaos associated with a larger store?
Value, then, is calculated based on quantitative (e.g., price of groceries) and qualitative
factors (e.g., time) and the stakeholder’s preference. In regards to the grocery store
decision, value is calculated based on the stakeholder’s preference and point of view at
that time, for that situation. Perhaps the stakeholder does not really care about the price
because he is in a hurry. He will choose the smaller closer grocery store over the larger
one because it is closer and faster. Value should also be all inclusive. If cost was the
only thing that is taken into account, the larger store would be selected. In other words,
to effectively decide between two or more options, whether it is a grocery store selection,
missile design, or requirement verification methods, all factors that affect and are affected
by the decision should be part of the descriptor of value.
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How about uncertainty? Is that taken into account? Should it be? Factors that
affect and are affected by decisions all have uncertainty associated with them in that there
is a chance (probability) that the factor may or may not be met such as the grocery item’s
availability in the smaller grocery store, or the cost of the items. Uncertainty surrounding
the more qualitative factors also exists, such as the chance that the store is closed or that
traffic is heavy, or the automobile breaks down. The answer to whether uncertainty
should be addressed in decision making is yes, and over history, brilliant minds have
addressed the concept of decision making under uncertainty. For example, John von
Neumann addressed a person’s preferences in terms of utility and said that utility could
be a numerical value that combined with probabilities would yield mathematical
expectations (Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). Von Neumann, Morgenstern (1947),
Arrow (Arrow 1963), and Arrow and Lind (1970) did extensive research on decision
making under uncertainty and enhanced and proved the topic into what is now called the
expected utility theorem. The theorem basically states that “only a particular scale of
value, unique to within a positive affine transformation, allows the values to be simply
summed to a meaningful result using the probabilities as weights. Values scaled to
possess this property are called utilities in the literature of economics. The weighted sum
of the utilities of the prospects of an outcome, using the probabilities of the prospects as
the weights, is called the expectation of the utilities, or simply the expected utility.
Arrow’s expected utility theorem states that, from a set of alternative actions, a rational
person will prefer to take the action with the greatest expected utility” (Collopy 2009, 4).
Is “utility” a “value” as defined above? Collopy demonstrates that utility and value
(monetary) are the same for typical design situations (Collopy 2009). Thus, the design
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with the greatest value is the preferred approach. The inclusion of uncertainty into value
thinking or value-centric methodology is critical in assessing and capturing the total
picture in order to understand what each options value or expected value really is. The
expected value, therefore, takes into account all the possible outcomes and the
probabilities that those outcomes will occur (or not) per the expected utility theory.
A number of authors and practitioners have used these concepts (i.e., value and
expected value) and applied them to value-centric philosophies to achieve better ways to
address decisions, processes, and complex problems (Brown and Eremenko 2009;
Brown, Eremenko, and Collopy 2009; Brathwaite and Saleh 2009; Keller 2013; and
Collopy and Horton 2002). Value-centric design for example “brings cost together with
performance attributes and the less tangible derived attributes (to also include robustness,
flexibility, and responsiveness) in a system value model that links all the attributes to net
value” (Brown, Eremenko, and Collopy 2009, p.3). Decisions are therefore based on this
net value which corresponds with the desired solution. Brown, Eremenko, and Collopy
(2009, 3) state that “the desired system (or solution) is the one that the stakeholder
desires, which necessitates a trade between value and cost, and the variance in each.”
Owen Brown and Paul Eremenko (2009) show how the use of value-centric design
methodologies support the design of optimized fractionated satellite systems. Joy
Brathwaite and Joseph Saleh (2009, 1) emphasize that by using “value and value
uncertainty as decision metrics in the down-selection process” more informed and better
acquisition decisions are made.
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The value-centric design methodology was introduced in a parallel development
of four teams (space industry prime contractors) for fractioned space architectures under
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency System F6 Program (Brown,
Eremenko, and Collopy 2009). The goal of the F6 Program was to “replace traditional,
highly-integrated, monolithic satellites with wirelessly-networked clusters of
heterogeneous modules incorporating the various payload and infrastructure functions”
(Brown, Eremenko, and Collopy 2009, 1). Each of these teams were provided few
specific requirements and given performance objectives that cover a “wide variety of
space missions and stakeholders” which served as the “basis of the architectural
approach” (Brown, Eremenko, and Collopy 2009, 2). Each of the teams developed a
process using value-centric design methodology to orchestrate design options. In
addition, a system value model was developed by each team using attributes (e.g.,
performance capability, robustness, availability) and cost to evaluate the designs. Since
the designs are uncertain, these attributes were treated as random variables in the model.
The fundamental question that was answered by the four teams in using this value-centric
design methodology is whether fractioned satellites are better than monolithic satellites.
All teams reported benefits associated with the fractioned spacecraft over the
conventional monolithic satellites using the value-centric design methodology.
Shari Keller (2013, 7) used a value-centric approach to show that “affordability is
achieved by a flow down of value guidance rather than through requirement flow down.”
A value-centric approach was also used by Collopy and Horton (2012) to determine
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prospective engine designs on the U.S. Air Force Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine
Engine.
While the DoD is mostly cost-centric when it comes to acquisition, a number of
authors have introduced the concept of value-centric acquisition as an important part of
the acquisition process. Joy Brathwaite and Joseph Saleh (2009) address the typical
systems engineering and program management focus for satellite systems in terms of the
cost-centric versus the value-centric mindset. The cost-centric approach (in terms of
satellite lifecycle cost reduction, transponder cost reduction, or performance
maximization for a fixed cost) has led to “the design and acquisition of increasingly
larger, long-lived, and more capable satellites, with the premise that the benefits resulting
from the economies of scale translate into more valuable satellites” (Brathwaite and Saleh
2009, 2). This cost-centric mind set is not without flaws as depicted by the authors of
various articles. The value of a system is dependent on the technical attributes, its
environment, and interfaces and is defined by a particular stakeholder. Brathwaite and
Saleh (2009, 3) state that “a value-centric framework extends the traditional cost-centric
approach by integrating additional information about the system in its environment and
its value potential into the down-selection process.” Thus, it is very difficult to determine
the impacts a decision will have, whether it is a satellite, or a requirement verification
method on the system’s total value if decisions are done based on a cost-centric approach.
Owen Brown and Paul Eremenko (2009) also compare value-centric acquisition
to the cost-centric approach to acquire space systems. They dispute the cost-centric
methodology and state that the evolving threat and the long durations of development
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programs counteract each other, producing redesigns and costly programs. Flexible
systems and modularization to minimize the risk and “enhance opportunity” is inherent in
value-centric acquisition. The challenge with a cost-centric acquisition is that as is, it
provides no incentives to develop flexible systems or “fully measure the impact of
robustness features on cost and benefits” (Brown and Eremenko 2009). By pursuing
value-centric acquisition more promising opportunities and insights can come to light
when assessing acquisition alternatives and alternate system designs.
Collopy‘s (1999) research points out that value-centric acquisition can reduce
program cost by $50 billion, in referencing the Joint Strike Fighter program. Valuecentric approaches used in various forums have important advantages (flexibility, cost
advantages, and a comprehensive view) over traditional cost-centric approaches that are
typically used in DoD as supported by the aforementioned articles.
These models and methodologies which address verification strategies defined in
the first three categories all have merits and, based on the situation, are valuable in
assessing the type of strategy a particular situation or program may use. Optimizing a
performance activity based on cost and risk provides decision makers with choices to
tradeoff cost versus risk or versus how well he or she expects that activity to perform.
These optimization methods, however, do not address the expected results, rework,
uncertainty, or value of the preferred strategy. The performance consequence based on
cost category takes into account uncertainty and the consequences of flawed results but
does not address rework, value or benefits for having passed good products. The third
category sets limits on cost and schedule as a function of defining a preferred strategy but
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it does not address the value of that strategy, benefits, rework, or uncertainty. The last
category addressing the value-centric methodology provides the basis to develop and
support the methodology in this dissertation. The incorporation of this value-centric
methodology has been used in various forums to support design choices, acquisition
decisions, or cost saving comparisons, as previously delineated. However, its use in
addressing requirement verification method selection (test or analysis) with the
incorporation of uncertainty, verification method results (e.g., pass, fail, flawed results,
and rework), and of course value has not been addressed.
These models and methodologies as well as the general findings in the research
from DoD and industry depict a gap in the current body of knowledge that addresses
requirement verification decision logic when there is a choice (test or analysis). The gap
is the lack of a holistic methodology that addresses value, uncertainty, verification
method results (e.g., pass, fail, flawed results, and rework), benefits, and value.
Development of such a methodology is the primary focus of the research outlined in this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH QUESTION

Two distinct observations can be summarized from past research and the current
way of doing business in the DoD. First, very informative and detailed guidance and
policy exist in the DoD and NASA that addresses requirement verification, planning,
development, and execution. This policy and guidance is in the form of handbooks,
mandates, standards, and other documentation and is addressed at all levels from the
overarching policy, such as in DoD 5000, to specific product specifications. A
tremendous amount of work has been done over the years to develop, modify, and even
perfect these guidelines so acquisition professionals can effectively tailor them to their
specific applications. The second observation from a review of the research literature and
existing methodologies is that decision making regarding how to verify a requirement or
a set of requirements is driven principally by cost and schedule pressures, even though
different decision making methodologies exist that can be applied to this decision.
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3.1 Current Methodology.
Figure 3.1 depicts an overview of a typical DoD requirement verification decision
dilemma and what is typically used in terms of decision making. The decision maker, as
part of SE policy and guidance, plans a verification program. He/she has to allocate a
certain amount of funds and time to complete the verification so the product can proceed
to the next stage of development, integration, or manufacturing. The decision maker
should be aware of the following factors:
i.

Verification may lead to some sort of rework or redesign due to possible
failures. Failures are not always negative, as the GAO or the news media
usually emphasize. Failures may lead to a better understanding of design
flaws, margins, and ways to make the product more robust. These failures
and the resulting actions (i.e., failure analysis, rework, and redesign) can
result in cost and schedule variances and are the subject of many critiques,
especially by GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011c;
2012a; 2012b).

ii.

The product that is going to be subjected to verification has an expected
condition. Typically verification is a way to assure the decision maker
that the product meets the requirements and the product’s condition
(design maturity, quality and manufacturing assuredness, robustness) is
adequate enough to be subjected to verification. There are many types of
verification depending on the objectives and thus each product and
situation is different. An electronic breadboard, for example, being
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Figure 3.1 Current Requirement Verification Decision Logic
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submitted to a humidity test (in verification) will have a high probability
of passing if the breadboard was designed correctly with the appropriate
parts, hermetically sealed, and manufactured correctly. The expected
condition of the product being subjected to verification should be
designed, developed, and manufactured to a level that in the decision
maker’s mind should meet the verification requirements.
iii.

Good products in the field will have benefits. The reason most DoD or
non-DoD products are designed, developed, and built is to obtain a
benefit. This benefit can be in terms of profit, company status, or market
share such as a private company building bicycles, for example. In the
DoD, benefits can be viewed in terms of protecting a soldier from harm or
death or deterrence like building up nuclear stockpiles and intercontinental
ballistic missiles during the Cold War. The benefits of having good
products in the field vary and are based on the point of view of the
decision maker. Benefits of a good product in the field are contrasted with
the non-benefits or consequences of having bad products in the field.
News media provide many examples of failed or flawed weapon systems
or everyday commercial items in the hands of consumers. The carmakers
constant recall notices for bad designs and material flaws cost the
companies millions if not billions of dollars in repairs in addition to
qualitative losses like their reputation, future sales, and market share.
Consumers also have additional costs such as time off to have the recall
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fixed, personal damages they may incur due to the faulty product, or even
death. GAO heavily critiques the weapon system programs for their
failures in the field (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011c;
2012a; 2012b). These, of course, are not all related to the lack of
verification scrutiny but the decision maker should be aware nevertheless
that a bad product in the field has negative consequences in terms of
repairs/retrofit costs, defensive posture, or even death.
iv.

Testing may be more rigorous than analysis. Testing a product to verify a
specific requirement (e.g., being able to operate after subjected to a high
temperature environment) entails subjecting the product to that
environment and operating it afterwards. This is an obvious statement but
the underlining process that this verification approach does is to check the
interactions of the components of the product at temperature, the effects of
the temperature at the material’s micro-level and specifically the
interaction between the components (i.e., the interfaces). These are all
exercised or “touched” by the actual temperature they are subjected to and
react in some way to that environment in a positive, or anticipated manner
or negatively. The conduct of analysis on the other hand can check the
material properties of the components, the electrical and mechanical
design, the thermal conductivity margins, and the like. Analysis, however,
may not be able to check the interfaces or interactions well enough due to
the complexity of the product and multitude of interactions.
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v.

Testing/analysis can pass a bad product or design and fail a good product
or design. Like the proverb states, “Nothing is certain except uncertainty.”
When a product is subjected to a verification approach (test, analysis,
inspection, or demonstration) there are two possible outcomes, pass or fail.
If the product passes, everything is great and life is good. If a product
fails, life is not so good. What does passing a product really tell the
decision maker? Passing a product can yield a passed good product or a
passed bad product. The medical profession uses the terminology of
specificity and sensitivity to define flawed results (i.e., passing bad
products or failing good products). Sensitivity is defined “as the
probability that the test says a person has the disease when in fact they do
have the disease” and specificity is defined as “the probability that the test
says a person does not have the disease when in fact they are disease free”
(Scheaffer 1999, 18). The circumstances around the results can be
attributed to many things like the testing house, approach selection,
models used in the analysis, and operator or analyst error. Nevertheless, a
decision maker should be aware that a passed item may be good or may be
bad and that a failed item may be good or it may be bad as well.

vi.

Risk, from a verification scenario point of view, has to do with an overall
assessment of the product not meeting the requirement in the time allotted
with the costs allocated.
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These factors may cross the decision maker’s mind and he/she may take them into
consideration when making a decision to pursue one approach versus another when
verifying requirements. However, no documented proof in DoD Guidance/Policy has
been found in the research other than the inclusion of cost, schedule, and risk in the
decision making. The decision maker relies on this guidance to make verification
approach decisions based on subjective assessments. These three metrics (i.e., cost,
schedule, and risk) are certainly addressed but the other critical factors that the decision
maker is aware of may not be brought to the forefront of the decision making. At the end
of the day, whether these factors are used (qualitatively) or not, a subjective decision is
made.
The DoD has been making subjective decisions in choosing between one
approach or another based on limited guidance/policy for years on countless products and
programs. Have they been doing it wrong? The question is not whether DoD has been
doing things wrong, there is really no way of knowing. The question is, does the decision
maker have a comprehensive view of the alternatives to be able to make a betterinformed decision, in a quantitative way that includes all of those factors that affect and
are affected by the decision?

3.2 What is Missing.
The decision maker, based on current DoD requirement verification policy and
guidance, chooses between analysis and test subjectively focusing on cost, schedule, and
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risk. The other factors may play a role in deciding, but the decision maker must make a
decision based on the information he/she has in front of him: cost of the approach, how
long it is going to take, and what the risk is. More often than not, when a choice is
presented, a less costly and shorter approach will be selected given that the risk between
the approaches is not at the extremes of each other. Is this the correct decision? What
other data can the decision maker use to help in that decision? The factors mentioned in
the previous section can be used in a way to help the decision maker make a better
informed decision. Figure 3.2 highlights those things that are not necessarily taken into
account in a holistic methodology but should be (i.e. uncertainty of the product going into
verification, uncertainty of the approach results, number of reworks, cost and schedule of
the reworks, benefits, and consequences).
Uncertainty is defined in many ways. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines it as
“the quality or state of being uncertain or in doubt.” The factors that the decision maker
should be aware of all have uncertainty associated with them that can be and should be
taken into account during decision making. Some decisions are trivial enough that it is
not necessary to address these factors in the decision making. However, most DoD
products requiring verification have uncertainty like the following that should be
addressed in a way that the decision maker can understand and effectively choose
between one method or the other.
i.

The uncertainty associated with the product’s expected condition going
into the verification method.
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Figure 3.2 What is Missing from the Current Requirement Verification Logic
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ii.

Verification method outcome (Pass or Fail) and its associated specificity
and sensitivity.

iii.

Possibility of rework/redesign and the number of reworks/redesigns
required.

iv.

The expected condition of the product after each rework/redesign cycle.

v.

The costs (and schedule) associated with each of the rework/redesign
cycles.

vi.

The cost and schedule estimates.

vii.

The benefits of passing good products.

viii.

The life-cycle costs after verification.

ix.

The consequences (cost) associated with having bad products in the field.

These uncertainties should play a key role in determining the value of one method
over another. The decision maker should have a better sense of what impacts a decision
or is impacted by the decision before choosing an option. The methodology proposed
and developed in this dissertation will address the factors that impact a decision and are
impacted by the decision with their associated uncertainties in a holistic methodology that
will provide the decision maker a clear metric to help him/her make a better informed
decision.
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3.3 Why a Comprehensive Methodology Is Needed
There are three fundamental reasons a comprehensive methodology is needed.
1.

Current approach is subjective and not comprehensive. Subjective
verification method selection driven by cost and schedule pressures may not
provide the most preferred approach.

2. Lack of DoD guidance and methodology. As the research has shown in
previous chapters, the DoD does not have discrete verification guidance
/requirements to assist decision makers in selecting between test or analysis.
DoD’s guiding documents/methodology for decision making that can be used
in support of requirement verification method selection does not address value
nor an integrated approach and has robustness issues. Many articles and GAO
critiques address the robustness issues, especially associated with the analysis
of alternative approach that programs use to make decisions. Brown and
Eremenko (2009) reviewed decision making in the DoD and state that “no
tools exist” that provide the decision makers a process to make “appropriate
trades in flexibility, cost, risk, and performance.” In addition, they further
state that “the arbitrary weighting scheme” referenced in decision making
guidance documents “provides no assurances that optimal balance between
cost, performance, and other system attributes is attained.” The U.S.
Government Accountability Office (2011b, 7) has acknowledged the issues
that program offices have when implementing these guidance documents and
have provided recommendations that address “… a robust analysis of
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alternatives …can help ensure that new programs have a sound, executable
business case that represents a cost-effective solution to meeting war fighters’
needs.” The GAO (2013b) also recommended that the Missile Defense
Agency “fully [assess] alternatives before selecting investments.”
Recommendations by the GAO and other authors or guidance
provided by the detailed documents are at times not followed or are
ineffectively executed and as such GAO continues to assess and critique the
program office’s implementation and execution of the guidance. The Missile
Defense Agency, which is not required to follow DoD AoA guidance due to
“its acquisition flexibilities” (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2013c,
2), “conducted some analyses that consider alternatives …it did not conduct
robust analyses of alternatives” (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2013a, 15). The Department of the Navy (DON) program “did not
sufficiently analyze alternative acquisition approaches…analysis contained
key weaknesses…costs were unreliable… [and] did not establish and analyze
sufficient measures for assessing each alternative’s ability to achieve program
goals and deliver program capabilities…these weaknesses mean that the DON
does not have a sufficient basis for knowing that it is pursuing the best
approach” (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011a). Another GAO
(2009, 12) report further states that “many of the AOAs … conducted limited
assessments of the risks of each alternative presented… some … focusing
only on the operational effectiveness and cost of alternatives.” It further states
that “the AoA for the Future Combat System … assessed the technical risks of
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each of the new development concepts for FCS, but did not assess and
compare the risks with those of the other alternatives” (GAO 2009, 15).
3. Cost. Verification and associated processes and results including rectification
are expensive. Subjective assessments and inconsistency in decision making
drive costs. Numerous studies identify testing costs and fault rectification
consuming a very large part of DoD’s development and operations budgets.
Hoppe, Engel, and Shachar (2007, 330) indicate that testing costs and “fault
rectification consumes as much as 60% of new product development.” The
GAO (2013a, 24) states that the Missile Defense Agency attributed a cost
growth “from approximately $236 million to over $1.2 billion, due to the costs
of additional flight tests including the target and test-range, investigating the
failure, developing failure resolutions, …” Keller, Collopy, and
Componation’s (2012) research shows that final cost growth of U.S. space
programs exceeds initial cost estimates by an average of more than 45% due
partly to mission failures.
Table 3.1 depicts the factors that are typically used in the current decision
methodology for requirements verification method selection, per the policy and guideline
documents addressed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. It also depicts what should be
addressed (and is addressed in the proposed Topic’s methodology) that would enhance
the decision making process.
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Table 3.1 Current Versus Topic Methodology Comparison.
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In summary, the current methodology falls short in addressing a number of factors
and their uncertainties in a holistic aggregate manner that PMs can use to make better
informed decisions. The introduction of the proposed methodology will not only enhance
the decision making process but it will lead to cost savings, a more robust analytical
process, and a documented methodology addressing decision making in terms of
choosing between a test or an analysis when developing requirement verification plans.

59

CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The previous chapter highlighted what is missing from the current requirement
verification method selection, specifically, deciding between verifying a product by
analysis or by testing. Chapter 3 also highlighted what is needed to help make better
informed decisions - a comprehensive methodology.
This chapter consists of two parts. First, it defines the needed comprehensive
methodology in general terms. Second, it develops the methodological approach.

4.1 Methodology
A review of the research literature identified the existence of a gap when
addressing requirement verification approach (i.e., test or analysis) selection. A
comprehensive method incorporating uncertainty, verification approach results, and
value, when deciding between a test or an analysis to verify a product was not found. Per
the literature review, the need for a comprehensive methodology is clear and current
approaches that are available, while not holistic, can be used to develop a more
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comprehensive methodology in an effort to fill the gap. One such methodology, the
value-centric approach as defined in chapter 2, was used as the basis for the development
of the methodology proposed in this dissertation - value-centric requirement verification
methodology (VCRVM).
To reiterate, the value-centric methodology is an approach that incorporates all of
the factors that affect a product and those that the product affects to yield a
comprehensive value to be used in decision making. In a comparison of products, the
product with the greatest value is the preferred approach. Value, in this context, is in
terms of worth or preference to the stakeholder. The inclusion of uncertainty in a valuecentric approach is vital in assessing and understanding the complete picture because of
the uncertainty inherent in estimating future outcomes and cost and schedule.
The value-centric requirements verification methodology proposed in this
dissertation is based on the expected value that the decision maker places on one
verification strategy compared to another. The VCRVM incorporates a comprehensive
set of factors that affect the verification of each requirement in a verification strategy
along with the uncertainty associated with the value estimates and the possible outcomes.
These factors, along with uncertainty (i.e., probabilities) are used to develop a
model that estimates the expected value obtained by verifying a product via each
approach for each requirement. The model assigns probabilities to each input for each
requirement. A set of outcomes are derived for each approach and each requirement
based on these probabilities, each with an associated value. The value for each outcome
is dependent on whether the product passed the requirement (including flawed results),
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failed the requirement (including flawed results), or was reworked. Value is defined as
the sum of the benefits gained, the costs incurred, and the consequences in terms of a
quantitative monetary number, adjusted to net present value to account for the time value
of money. The model calculates and compares an expected value for each requirement
and each verification approach resulting in the verification approach (i.e., testing or
analysis) with the greatest expected value as the preferred verification approach in the
strategy.

4.1.1

Ground Rules and Assumptions:
The value-centric requirement verification methodology is based on certain

ground rules and assumptions and is provided as guidance, to be tailored to the particular
situation.


While the VCRVM can be tailored to address specific situations, it is written with
the DoD Acquisition Qualification Testing milestone in mind. This milestone as
defined by the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (U.S. Department of Defense
2011a) is a formal verification of the design, product, and processes and a
precursor to the full rate production decision. As such, the VCRVM is based on
subjecting a product to a verification approach to verify each requirement
sequentially (e.g., the humidity environment then the vibration environment).
Addressing multiple simultaneous environments is left for future research.
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Value, as previously defined, is a numerical measure that reflects the worth of one
product over another. In terms of this verification approach, it reflects the worth
of one verification strategy over another based on a particular stakeholder’s
preference. As such, this value is assessed from the point of view of the
Government.



Requirement verification is verifying that the product meets a set of requirements.
As such, a product whether a hand gun or a more complex system (e.g., a missile
system) will have a number of requirements that will need to be verified. The
majority of these will have a verification approach (e.g., test, analysis,
demonstration, or inspection) allocated to them via guidance, required policy, or
because it is obvious that no other verification approach except a specific one,
will verify that product. The VCRVM addresses only those requirements that
have a choice (i.e., verification by test or analysis) and assumes that all other
requirements have successfully passed their respective verification approach.
Addressing all requirements in a verification strategy is left for future research.



Once a product is subjected to a verification approach, it will either pass or fail.
This VCRVM assumes a product will not partially pass a verification approach.



Once rework is conducted, the same verification approach will be used to reverify the reworked product. It is assumed that there will be a maximum of three
rework cycles before the product is rejected and no longer be a viable candidate
for the program. Total redesign or program cancelation are possible at this point.
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4.1.2

Factors
The VCRVM consists of a comprehensive set of factors that affect the verification

of each requirement as well as the inclusion of uncertainty. These factors along with
uncertainty are used in the development of a model for a specific application. Each
situation is different so the guidelines for this VCRVM can be tailored to the specific
circumstances. The objective is to provide the decision maker with a different view of
the requirement verification strategy so a better informed decision can be made. Since
each application is different, the factors that affect the verification are segregated into
three categories, cost, benefits, and consequences.


Cost. Cost is defined as the cost to the Government which includes fees,
overhead rates, and other variables that are typically added as part of the cost to
Government contracts. Estimating the cost of a product‘s verification approach or
estimating the products life cycle cost may be a significant feat, even if the
estimates are developed using the latest cost estimating tools and/or techniques.
Estimators usually take into account several variables like man-hours in terms of
engineering, management, quality assurance, test, and other disciplines to develop
the estimates. Within those disciplines (e.g., engineering), there are subdisciplines like mechanical engineering, software engineering, electrical
engineering, design, and manufacturing. Estimating the (multi-level discipline)
man-hours required to implement a verification approach or the life cycle of a
product is just one fraction of the total estimate. There are different levels of
material costs, subcontractor costs, tooling costs, overhead costs, and other types
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of costs that have to be taken into account as well. Other considerations include
risk posture, schedule, development and/or acquisition strategy, as well as the
individual decision maker or their boss’s perspective or guidance. The estimate
can easily escalate into a multi variable matrix of entries that could overwhelm
the brightest estimators. There are many ways to combine all of these factors in
order to yield a reasonable estimate. Cost estimating techniques or approaches
vary depending on the organization and even the individual. Approaches
commonly used are:
-

Rough order of magnitude estimate: This is the approach where the estimate
is quickly developed, usually by an experienced estimator, based on his/her
own experience with similar programs.

-

Analogy: Estimates are derived based on how similar the new program is to
existing programs. The use of expert opinion (i.e., not necessarily the
estimator) determines the similarity of the new product or program to that of
an existing product or program and an adjustment factor is used to account for
the difference (Castagno et al. 2011, Garrett 2008, and U.S. Department of
Defense 2007c).

-

Parametric: Cost estimating technique where technical variables such as
weight, thrust, missile diameter, etc. are used to derive cost data in a model.

-

Bottoms-up: Detailed estimates of tasks, material, labor costs, and other
pertinent factors are calculated to estimate costs (Garrett 2008 and U.S.
Department of Defense 2007c).
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For the most part, however, estimators use a combination of these methods
and off-the shelf models like the Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools
(ACEIT) software model (U.S. Department of Defense 2004), or a
proprietary/organization specific model to develop their cost estimates. The DoD,
NASA, and other Government organizations use these and a variety of
individualized organizational models/approaches to develop their own cost
estimates. For example, NASA uses the parametric NASA Air Force Cost Model
(Hamaker 2006).
Even with the use of these techniques, cost variances (actual cost minus the
estimate) continue to plague the DoD as various Government Accountability
Office reports, journal articles, and news articles highlight. The U.S. space
programs, for example, “exceed the initial cost estimates by an average of more
than 45%” (Keller, Collopy, and Componation 2012, 1). Cost estimates are just
that, estimates of a future event and since the future is by definition uncertain,
estimates will have errors. Understanding the cost estimate, the uncertainty
surrounding the assumptions used to develop that estimate, and the use of
stochastic tools are useful in understanding and minimizing cost variance.
Defining cost as part of the VCRVM entails three main areas, the cost of the
verification approach, the cost of rework, and the life cycle cost (from the point of
a good product passing verification).
1. Cost of the approach. Depending on the product, the cost to verify by
analysis or by testing is relatively straight forward to estimate and should
produce a cost estimate that has a small variance. Typically, test houses
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are contracted to verify products based on fixed-priced contracts and thus
their quotes reflect those prices. Previous data on similar products and
situations can also be good estimating techniques to yield good estimates.
Since these are estimates, a probability distribution based on similar
programs should be defined or assigning a variance to the mean estimate
needs to be done.
NOTE: When estimating the cost of a non-destructive test, (e.g., guidance
unit subjected to vibration, if it passes, could be used to verify an
operational shock level), do not include the cost of the asset since this cost
should have been accounted for in the pre-verification cost estimates.
2. Cost of rework. Rework is the results of a failure. Rework in the
VCRVM is defined as those actions that are required so the product can be
re-verified. These actions include failure analysis, corrective action, a
replacement item if the asset is destroyed in a test, documentation, parts or
component testing, personnel support, and additional analysis. If the
product fails an analysis verification approach and it is deemed that the
design has a flaw, an additional item may not be needed, but a redesign
may. Each rework verification approach should be addressed separately.
A distribution and/or variance around the mean for rework cost should be
identified. When estimating the cost of rework, consideration should be
given to the expected duration of the rework items in the cost calculations.
3. Life Cycle Cost – Post valid verification. Valid verification implies that a
good product has passed all of the requirements. Life cycle cost in the
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VCRVM implies the costs associated with the activities after a product has
passed the verification. The cost depends on the product but could include
integration into a higher assembly, additional testing, manufacturing,
production costs, fielding, transportation, operations, sustainment, and
disposal. These estimates will have the largest cost dispersion and are
usually calculated as part of the program’s approved cost estimate.
Caution must be exercised on the estimate construct if it assumes
that the verification will be successful (i.e., no failures). Typically,
estimates are optimistic but contain an additional risk amount for
unknowns. The cost estimate portion of the risk needs to be understood as
it may be used in the benefits and consequences portion of this VCRVM
model logic.
Further discussion on the specific calculation of these costs as they relate
to the VCRVM is addressed in section 4.2.1.


Benefit. Benefits, in terms of the VCRVM, are those quantitative and qualitative
characteristics that make the selection of an approach more advantageous to the
Government. Benefits can be viewed as the reason materiel solutions are pursued
in order to fill gaps and shortfalls in operational capability. A system in the field
designed and successfully verified to a specific operational capability has a
greater benefit than one with less capability or none at all. Protecting a city from
a rogue missile threat, for example, has the benefit of protecting the life,
infrastructure, property, country tranquility, and perhaps peace within the region.
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These benefits, while qualitative in nature, may be translated to
quantitative monetary amounts that can be used to calculate the value used in the
VCRVM. Since these monetary quantities are estimates, they can be determined
using the same techniques used to calculate cost estimates. If the benefit estimate
used is a point estimate with very low confidence, however, it is recommended
that it be assigned a probability distribution based on similar programs and be
subjected to a Monte Carlo simulation.
Benefits are usually separated into two categories, tangible and intangible
benefits. Tangible benefits are usually stated in dollars (such as a unit cost
reduction for additional assets). Intangible benefits are those benefits, such as
data rights, that are not easily converted into dollars. Data rights are important to
the Government in gaining insight into the design and having the ability to pursue
other options (vendors) if so warranted. Estimating the costs of obtaining data
rights can be done via contractual inquiries or other means. Estimating the
benefits of the Government having those data rights can be derived from the
translation of alternative vendor price reductions, reduced developmental efforts
or less cost, reduced risk of cost increases due to sole source acquisition and
control, and similar things. Thus, translating data rights into a quantitative value
can be done with some thought and the right personnel. Benefit estimates should
address the same timeframe as cost estimates, usually the program/product’s life
cycle. For requirement verification, a benefit of passing a valid product can be
reduced impact on higher level schedule, protecting a soldier from harm’s way,
protecting a soldier(s) from death, protecting a city, or increased congressional
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support for future funding. Each situation is different. Further discussion on the
specific calculation of these benefits as they relate to the VCRVM is addressed in
section 4.2.1.


Consequences. Consequences are the result of negative events. A negative event
is one that would pass the verification with a bad product. The consequences of
having bad products in the field could be catastrophic and extremely costly.
Estimating this cost should be based on the same techniques used to develop the
cost estimates. Consequences include qualitative and quantitative items such as
additional rework, repairs, retrofits, transportation, schedule, availability,
readiness, defensive posture, and congressional support. Further discussion on
the calculation of these consequences, in terms of a monetary value and as they
relate to the VCRVM, is found in section 4.2.1.

4.1.3

Uncertainty
Uncertainty is the lack of knowledge about an event. Probability is a way

(quantitatively) to think about uncertainty. Every event, factor, or decision has
uncertainty associated with it. Incorporating uncertainty into the VCRVM will address
three areas; the uncertainty surrounding the products expected condition going into a
verification approach, the expected outcome of the product after being subjected to that
approach, and the uncertainty surrounding each of the factor’s estimated values.


The uncertainty surrounding the products expected condition going into a
verification approach is subjective and it should be based on the reliance of
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subject matter experts and the decision maker. This expected condition is defined
in terms of the probability that the initial product, going into verification, is good
and will meet the requirements, whether it is subjected to analysis or to testing.
This probability is the wellness expectation of the product going into a
verification approach. The decision maker along with the subject level experts
usually have a good sense of what a products state is prior to the start of
verification. This subjective determination is based on a number of variables such
as the technology maturity, the vendor, previous tests, design reviews, and the
application. The decision maker also assumes that by the time the product is
ready to enter the verification process, a disciplined systems engineering conduct
would have been accomplished. This uncertainty is divided into two
probabilities, the probability that the product is good (P(G)) and the
corresponding probability that the product is bad (1 – P(G)) or P(B). Of course, if
the decision maker along with the subject matter experts assess that the product is
ready to enter the verification process, the probability of the product being good
should be high.
This situation presents itself at the start of the verification process with the
first requirement as well as after each rework cycle. The rework cycle is a result
of a product failing a verification approach. This rework cycle is meant to correct
the failure. The corrective action could yield a good product or a bad product
prior to re-verification. Each rework cycle is different depending on the situation.
The product coming out of the rework cycle and ready to reenter the verification
approach will have a different expected condition than that of the initial product.
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The example presented in chapter 5 assumes a “rework” cycle as a point where
the next best design is chosen and thus a degradation factor is used to decrement
that lower design hierarchy.
There are two ways to address the number of rework cycles within the
VCRVM. The first is to limit the rework cycles to a finite number based on the
subject matter experts’ experience on similar products. The second is to use three
rework cycles. Typically three reworks are advisable in electronic parts,
specifically on multilayer boards, due to the possibility of doing more harm than
good (Garrison et al. 1995).


The expected outcome of the product, after being subjected to a verification
approach, is that it will either pass or fail with the respective probabilities.
However, since the product can either be good or bad, the result of the verification
approach will be based on the products expected condition (i.e., good or bad).
Thus, based on probability theory, the outcome yields conditional probabilities
where the probability of the approach outcome is dependent on the probability of
the product’s expected condition (Montgomery and Runger 2011). Therefore, the
result of each verification approach is four possible outcomes, each with a
probability; 1) The product passes given it is a good product, 2) the product fails,
given it is a good product, 3) the product passes given it is a bad product, and 4)
the product fails given it is a bad product.
Defining these conditional probabilities is again subjective and should be
based on the input from subject matter experts and the decision maker. The
assessment of these conditional probabilities is different for each requirement and
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depends on whether a product is going to be verified by analysis or by test. For
example, testing may be more rigorous than analysis due to the interactions of the
components during testing that may not be possible to analyze correctly. Thus,
verifying a product by testing should have a lower probability of passing than that
of analysis.


The uncertainty surrounding each of the estimated factor values is a function of
how the estimate was developed (i.e., what type of estimating technique is used
and what factor is being estimated). Since these are estimates of future outcomes,
they are best described as random variables in the VCRVM.

4.2 The Approach
Figure 4.1 illustrates the general approach used in the VCRVM. This methodology
is used to develop a model for each specific situation that utilizes inputs factors,
probabilities, and expected utility theory, as previously mentioned. Fundamentally,
Figure 4.1 illustrates that a product can be good or bad with a certain probability. The
product can be verified that it meets a requirement by test or by analysis. The logic for
each verification approach (i.e., test or analysis) is the same. The product is subjected to
a verification approach where it can either pass or fail the first requirement with certain
probabilities. If the product fails, it is subjected to a rework cycle where it is repaired and
deemed ready to re-enter the verification approach. There is a maximum of three
reworks, per previous discussion. The reworked products will also have an expected
condition (i.e., probabilities) associated with it being good or bad, as well as associated
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costs for the rework. Once a product passes the requirement via a verification approach it
will be subjected to the next requirement. The logic calculates the last requirement’s
expected value for each verification approach first. These expected values are compared
and the highest expected value is the preferred approach for the last requirement. Its
numerical value is used in the calculations of the preceding requirement’s expected value
for each verification approach. The highest expected value is the preferred approach for
that second-to-last requirement. The logic is the same until all requirements have been
assessed resulting in a verification strategy that has the highest overall expected value.
The rationale and the details for this logic is addressed in section 4.2.2.

4.2.1

Terminology and Notation
The following terminology is used to define the factors and uncertainty in the

model.


Cost of the analysis. This cost estimate will be different for each requirement.
The overall equation to calculate the cost of the analysis is provided in equation
(4.1). Typically it includes man-hours to develop the analysis plan, conduct the
analysis, verification review participation, management reviews, documentation,
and model(s) execution costs. Each discipline associated with the analysis
whether it is the conduct, the review, or the approval has a different labor
category and depending on the company, each will have associated burden
factors. For example, an engineer may have a labor category that charges
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Figure 4.1 Value-centric Requirement Verification Methodology Logic
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$40.00 per hour for a mid-level engineer that is supporting the program’s
verification activities. That engineer, however, may work for a company level
engineering organization that charges a percentage of the man-hours to address
management activities, and other miscellaneous administration functions. Each
labor category is different and each contract will have different rates, overhead
charges, fees, and profits. These will have to be accounted for in the cost
estimate. Computer model usage and facility/tool operations also contain costs or
usage factors in addition to operator man-hours. A very high speed computer may
be needed to run a specific high fidelity analysis, for example. Since not every
company has very high speed computers or only one may be available, its use will
be restricted and charged accordingly. These costs will be passed on to the
customer (i.e., the Government). Typically, cost estimating techniques previously
discussed address different methods to capture these costs. In general, the cost of
the analysis can be captured in the following equation.

CA = ∑ (Analysis hours * analysis labor rate) +
∑ (engineering hours * engineering labor rate) +
∑ (Management hours * Management labor rate) +
∑ (Documentation hours*Technical writer labor rate) + . . . +
∑ (Model development hours*model developer labor rate) +
∑ (Operator hours * Computer model usage rate) +
∑ (operator hours) * (tools/facility usage rate) + . . .
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(4.1)



Cost of the test. This cost estimate will be different for each requirement and for
each situation. The overall equation to calculate the cost of the test is provided in
equation (4.2). Typically it includes man-hours to develop the test plan, conduct
the test and analyze the data, verification review participation, management
reviews, documentation, and test equipment or test facility costs. The costs are
calculated very similar to those described in the cost of the analysis section. The
test equipment and facility costs depend on the product, program, and
requirement. These can vary from the costs associated with testing the product in
a temperature controlled chamber to estimating the costs associated with targets,
communication systems, satellites, and other supporting activities.

CT = ∑ (Test conductor hours * Test conductor labor rate) +
∑ (engineering hours * engineering labor rate) +
∑ (Management hours * Management labor rate) +

(4.2)

∑ (Documentation hours*Technical writer labor rate) + . . . +
∑ (Operator hours * test chamber usage rate) +
∑ (operator hours) * (equipment, tools or facility usage rate) +
∑ (Test auxiliary costs) + . . .



Cost of the rework cycle. This cost estimate will be different for each
requirement and for each situation. The overall equation to calculate the cost of
rework is provided in equation (4.3). Typically it includes man-hours to conduct
the failure analysis, re-design effort, implementation of the corrective action,
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development of documentation, failure board review participation, and
management reviews. The costs are calculated very similar to those described in
the cost of the analysis section. Depending on the product and the failure,
additional costs are possible associated with lower level testing and analytical
effort, equipment and facility costs.

CW = ∑ (Reliability Engineering hours) * (Reliability
Engineering labor rate) + ∑ (Engineering hours *
Engineering labor rate) + ∑ (Management hours *
Management labor rate) + ∑ (Documentation hours *

4.3)

Technical writer labor rate) + . . . +
∑ (Operator hours (subassembly level testing)) *
Test chamber usage rate) + . . .
∑ (operator hours (subassembly level testing)) *
(equipment, tools or facility usage rate) + . . .



Rework Cycle. A rework cycle is a result of a failure. The rework cycle includes
all of the activities necessary to identify and correct the failure to allow the
product to re-enter the verification process. As stated earlier, the maximum
number of rework cycles is three (3).



Cost of post verification activities. This cost estimate includes all of the life-cycle
costs after a product has passed the verification. The overall equation to calculate
the cost of the post verification activities is provided in equation (4.4). The cost
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depends on the product but could include integration into a higher assembly,
additional testing, manufacturing, production costs, fielding, transportation,
operations, sustainment, and disposal.

CP = ∑ (development cost) +
∑ (manufacturing and production costs) +
∑ (fielding and sustainment costs) +

(4.4)

∑ (operations costs) + ∑ (disposal costs).



Cost of having a bad product in the field (consequences). The overall equation to
calculate the cost of having a bad product in the field is provided in equation
(4.5). This cost estimate includes all of the activities associated with having a bad
product in the field once it passed verification. Typically, higher level integration
testing, field testing, inspections, or maintenance could identify the product as
bad. The worst case scenario would be that the product is not checked or tested
and is fielded and fails to do its mission. Estimating the scenario could be
difficult depending on the product but a realistic scenario should be used that
addresses the specific situation. Incorporating the different scenarios where a
product could fail after it passed verification in the VCRVM is left for future
research.
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CF = ∑ (failure analysis cost) + ∑ (corrective action cost) +

(4.5)

∑ (verification cost) + ∑ (retrofit cost).



Benefits. As defined previously, benefits are those quantitative and qualitative
characteristics that make the selection of a verification approach more
advantageous to the Government. Determining these characteristics is a difficult
part of the VCRVM and as such, a multidiscipline team approach that includes all
of the stakeholders should be used. The overall equation to calculate the benefits
is provided in equation (4.6). The objective of the product (i.e., why is it being
developed) is a good starting point (e.g., missile defense system, truck to carry
personnel, satellite program for surveillance). Estimating a quantitative value for
benefits includes technical, programmatic, and political characteristics (e.g.,
defense of a populated area at a given probability of success requirement or
achieving successful verification in time will defer additional development and
procurement efforts). An example calculation of a benefit estimate is the defense
of a populated city from a rogue missile threat. The product is a missile defense
system. The benefit of such a product being successfully verified can be
estimated by calculating the city population, the probability of success of that
product against that rogue missile and the estimated cost of life and infrastructure.
Estimating the political characteristics is more complex and is dependent on the
situation. For example, a product that successfully passes verification and it is
fielded may yield political support in terms of additional funding to procure more
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products (i.e., defend more cities) or less Government oversight. A quantitative
number can be calculated based on the defense of the city population or by
calculating the hours expended to answer inquiries if the product would have
failed (i.e. successful product will not have the oversight that an unsuccessful
product would have).

B = ∑ (technical characteristics) + ∑ (programmatic characteristics) +
∑ (political characteristics).



(4.6)

Outcome. An outcome is the effect of a product deemed good or bad, the
verification approach passed or failed, or if it was reworked. The number of
outcomes is dependent on the number of requirements and the number of reworks.
Each outcome will have a value and a probability which is calculated based on the
conditional probabilities of that outcome. For example, the probability of an
outcome of a good product passing would be the result of the probability of a
good product times the conditional probability that the product passed given that
it was good as provided in the following equation.

P outcome of a good product passing = P (good product)* P (pass│good product)



Value. As previously defined, value is the numerical worth of something. In
terms of the VCRVM, value is the sum of the cost plus consequences (if any) plus
the benefits (if any), where cost and consequences are negative numbers. Each
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outcome will have a different value depending on whether the product is deemed
good or bad, the verification approach passed or failed, or was reworked. The
overall equation to calculate value is provided in equation (4.7). For example, a
good product that passes verification will contain the costs associated with the
approach used to verify the requirements, the life cycle cost (post valid
verification) plus the benefits of having a good product in the field. A bad
product passing verification, however, will have a different value. That is, the
value will be the costs associated with the approach used to verify the
requirements, the life cycle costs (post valid verification) plus the consequences
of having a bad product in the field. There may not be any benefits associated
with this outcome depending on the product. Thus, the value for each outcome is
derived from equation (4.1) or (4.2), depending on whether value is being derived
for analysis or a test, plus equations (4.3) through (4.6).

V = n*Cost of approach + m*CW + CP + CF + B,

(4.7)

where n is the number of times the verification approach was conducted, cost of
the approach is either CT or CA, m is the number of reworks that was conducted,
CW is the rework cost, CP is the post verification cost, CF is the cost of having a
failed product in the field, and B is the benefit.
The verification approach cost should be the same every time the product
is subjected to that approach (i.e., after each rework cycle) for each requirement.
The exception would be the costs associated with not having to develop the pre82

verification documentation but these should be minimal. For example, reverifying a product via testing to the same requirement will entail using the same
test set up, equipment, and documentation reporting costs and perhaps a slight
modification to the pre-verification documentation.
Rework costs could be different for every rework cycle depending on the
situation. Thus, equation (4.7) could be modified to reflect each rework cycle
depending on the circumstance.


Present Value. Life cycle cost, cost of verification, benefits, and consequences (in
terms of cost) all occur at different timeframes. In order to aggregate these costs
and benefits across the product’s life cycle, these should be converted to a present
value to account for the time value of money. The overall equation to calculate
present value is provided in equation (4.8). The year used to calculate the present
value is based on the program’s specific needs (e.g., this could be year that
verification is scheduled to start or it could be the year the verification plan is
being developed). The critical point is that the present value should be calculated
to the same referenced year, and should include inflation. This calculation is used
in defining the present value for costs, consequences, and benefits as defined in
equations (4.1) through (4.6).

Present value =

,
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(4.8)

where FACTOR is the cost, consequence and/or benefit, t is time, and i is the
discount rate. For Government projects, the discount rate, per United States
Office of Management and Budget (1992) is 7 percent.


Uncertainty of the products expected condition going into a verification approach.
As previously defined this uncertainty or probability is subjective and determined
by the decision maker and the subject matter experts. For the purpose of
illustrating its use in the VCRVM, the probability that the product is good is
labeled P (G) and the corresponding probability that the product is bad is labeled
(1 – P (G)).



Uncertainty of the expected outcome of the product after being subjected to a
verification approach. As previously defined, this uncertainty or probability is
subjective and determined by the decision maker and the subject matter experts
based on the products design maturity, the vendor’s technical, managerial, and
manufacturing ability, and the product’s previous design and testing (i.e., lower
level testing and integration) results. There are four expected outcomes of a
verification approach, as stated previously, each with an associated conditional
probability; 1) product passes given it is good, 2) product fails given it is good, 3)
product passes given it is bad, and 4) product fails given it is bad.



Expected value. The expected value is the weighted average of all of the
outcomes for each approach. The overall equation to calculate the expected value
is provided in equation (4.9). For the VCRVM, it is the sum of all of the
outcomes value times its respective uncertainty (i.e., probability).
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E (V) =

,

(4. 9)

where o is the outcome, V is the value of that outcome, and p is the probability of
that outcome.

4.2.2

Logic
The VCRVM incorporates the aforementioned factors and uncertainty into a

model specifically designed for each application. The decision maker along with the
subject matter experts estimate the costs associated with verifying each requirement by
test (CT using equation (4.2)) or by analysis (CA using equation (4.1)), rework cost (CW
using equation (4.3)), life-cycle cost once the product has been verified (passed) (CP
using equation (4.4)), the consequences of having a bad product in the field (CF using
equation (4.5)), and the benefits of having successfully verified a product (B using
equation (4.6)), and converted-all to present value using equation (4.8). The uncertainties
(probabilities) associated with the products expected condition and approach results are
also estimated by the decision maker and subject matter experts. These are used as inputs
in the model.
The logic used in the VCRVM will be defined in two steps. The first step will
assume that only one requirement is to be verified. The second step will include the logic
for instances where more than one requirement needs to be verified. The logic for these
two steps is different. The reason for the difference is that the verification of each
requirement is dependent on the other (e.g., failing one requirement and passing the next
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will not verify the product). Since the preferred verification strategy is based on the
highest expected value of each approach for each requirement, the highest expected value
of one requirement is used to calculate the expected value of the next requirement.

4.2.2.1 Step one, One Requirement logic.
A product (with probabilities of being good or bad) when subjected to a
verification approach can either pass or fail resulting in four outcomes, good product
passes the approach, good product fails the approach, bad product passes the approach,
and bad product fails the approach (see Figure 4.2). Each outcome leads to a different
path depending on the number of requirements to be verified and the number of reworks
that are assumed. For one requirement and three reworks, the following is an explanation
of each of the outcomes and the related path.

Figure 4.2 Possible Outcomes
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For the outcome where a good product passes the approach (outcome A), the
value is computed using equation (4.7). Outcome A will yield a value that equates to the
cost of the approach plus the cost of the post verification activities (CP) derived by
equation (4.4), plus the benefits (B) that a good product in the field would bring derived
by equation (4.6). Since a good product that passed a verification approach will not yield
consequences as defined in equation (4.5) the costs associated with having a bad product
in the field (CF) in equation (4.7) would be zero. The rework variable (CW) in equation
(4.7) would also be zero because for this example, this outcome did not yield a rework
cycle. Thus, for outcome A, the value equation becomes

Voutcome A = Cost of approach + CP + B.

For this outcome, the probability is computed based on the probability of the
product being good and the conditional probability of the product passing, given it is a
good product as provided in equation (4.10). This probability is calculated as follows:

Probabilityoutcome A = P1 (G) * P (pass│ G),

(4.10)

where P1(G) is the initial probability of a good product and P (pass│ G) is the
conditional probability that a product passes given that it is good.
For the outcome where a good product fails the verification approach (i.e.,
outcome B), a rework cycle may be executed based on the decision makers initial input of
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pursuing one or more rework cycles. If a decision maker chooses, as an input, not to
conduct any rework cycles, the value for this outcome would be the cost of the approach.
If the decision maker chooses the recommended three rework cycles, outcome B will
yield four outcomes as shown in Figure 4.3 (i.e., 1) a good product passes the verification
approach, 2) a good product fails the approach, 3) a bad product passes the approach, and
4) a bad product fails the approach).

Figure 4.3 Rework Outcomes

Each of these four outcomes (B1, B2, B3, and B4) leads to a different path and
the value calculations using equation (4.7) will contain the variable CW. The value for
outcome B1, based on equation (4.7), is
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Voutcome B1 = 2*Cost of approach + 1*CW + CP + B,

where the outcome B1 is a good product passing the verification approach. In this case,
the verification approach was executed twice (i.e., 2 times the cost of the approach), one
rework cycle was conducted (i.e., 1 times the cost of the rework), and since the product
passed having been deemed a good product, the consequences variable (CF) is not
applicable. The product would be fielded and benefits incurred. The probability for this
outcome takes into account the expected condition of the product as it comes out of the
rework cycle and the associated probability of having passed after rework. This
probability is calculated as follows:

Probabilityoutcome B1 = P1 (G) * P (fail│ G) * P2(G) * P (pass│ G),

where P1(G) is the initial probability of a good product, P (fail│G) is the conditional
probability that a product passes given that it is good, P2(G) is the probability of a good
product after the first rework cycle, P (pass│G), is the conditional probability that a
product passes given that it is good.
The value for outcome B2 for one rework cycle, based on equation (4.7), is

Voutcome B2 = 2*Cost of approach + 1*CW,
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where the outcome B2 is a good product failing the verification approach. In this case,
the verification approach was executed twice (i.e., 2 times the cost of the approach), one
rework cycle was conducted (i.e., 1 times the cost of the rework), and since the product
failed, the consequences variable (CF), the post verification variable (CP) and the
benefits variable (B) are not applicable. A failed product would not be fielded. Since the
product failed the verification approach, the number of reworks that were initially
inputted, is critical. If only one rework was initially inputted, the value for this outcome
will be twice the cost of the approach plus the cost of the rework cycle. If the
recommended three rework cycles were initially inputted, this outcome would yield four
more outcomes (similar to outcomes B1 through B4). The value and their respective
probabilities for these additional outcomes is again dependent on whether the product is
deemed good or bad, whether the product passes the verification approach, and the
number of reworks that were inputted. The probability for this outcome, if only one
rework cycle was selected as an input would take into account the expected condition of
the product as it comes out of the rework cycle just like in outcome B1 and the associated
probability of having failed after rework. This probability is calculated as follows:

Probabilityoutcome B2 = P1 (G) * P (fail│ G) * P2(G) * P (fail│ G),

where P1(G) is the initial probability of a good product, P (fail│G) is the conditional
probability that a product fails given that it is good, P2(G) is the probability of a good
product after it the first rework cycle.
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The value for outcome B3, based on equation (4.7), is

Voutcome B3 = 2*Cost of approach + 1*CW + CP + CF,

where the outcome B3 is a bad product passing the verification approach. In this case,
the verification approach was executed twice, one rework cycle was conducted, and since
the product passed, the post verification costs are incurred. Notice the Benefits are not
included since a bad product in the field will yield consequences rather than benefits.
Thus, the consequence variable (CF) is included. The probability for this outcome takes
into account the expected condition of the product as it comes out of the rework cycle and
the associated probability of having passed after rework. This probability is calculated as
follows:

Probabilityoutcome B3 = P1 (G) * P (fail│G) * P2(G) * P (pass│B),

where P1(G) is the initial probability of a good product, P (fail│G) is the conditional
probability that a product fails given that it is good, P2(G) is the probability of a good
product after the first rework cycle, and P (pass│B) is the conditional probability that a
product passes given that it is bad.
The value for outcome B4 for one rework cycle, based on equation (4.7), is

Voutcome B4 = 2*Cost of approach + 1*CW,
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where the outcome B4 is a bad product failing the verification approach. In this case, the
verification approach was executed twice, one rework cycle was conducted, and since the
product failed, the consequences variable (CF), the post verification variable (CP) and the
benefits variable (B) are not applicable. A failed product would not be fielded. Since the
product failed the verification approach, the number of reworks that were initially
inputted, is again critical. If only one rework was initially inputted, the value for this
outcome will be twice the cost of the approach plus the cost of the rework cycle. If the
recommended three rework cycles were initially inputted, this outcome would yield four
more outcomes (similar to outcomes B1 through B4). The value and their respective
probabilities for these additional outcomes is again dependent on whether the product is
deemed good or bad, whether the product passes the verification approach, and the
number of reworks that were inputted. The probability for this outcome, if only one
rework cycle was selected as an input would take into account the expected condition of
the product as it comes out of the rework cycle just like in outcome B2 and the associated
probability of having failed after rework. This probability is calculated as follows:

Probabilityoutcome B4 = P1 (G) * P (fail│G) * P2(B) * P (fail│B),

where P1(G) is the initial probability of a good product, P (fail│G) is the conditional
probability that a product fails given that it is good, P2(B) is the probability of a bad
product after the first rework cycle, and P (fail│B) is the conditional probability that a
product fails, given it is bad.
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For the outcome where a bad product passes the verification approach (outcome
C), the value of that outcome is also computed using equation (4.7). For this outcome,
however, the benefit variable (B) and the rework variable (CW) are not applicable. A
bad product will not have any benefits since it is assumed that it will fail in the field and
will generate costs associated with retrofitting the product as defined earlier under
variable (CF). Thus, the consequence variable (CF) is included.

Voutcome C = Cost of approach + CP + CF.

For this outcome, its probability is computed based on the probability of the
product being bad and the conditional probability of the product passing, given it is a bad
product as provided in equation (4.11). This probability is calculated as follows:

Probabilityoutcome C = P1 (B) * P (pass│ B),

(4. 11)

where P1(B) is the initial probability of a bad product and P (pass│B) is the conditional
probability that a product passes given that it is bad.
Lastly, for the outcome where a bad product fails the verification approach
(outcome D), a rework cycle will be executed, costs incurred and the products expected
condition after re-entering the verification approach will be calculated, just like in
outcome B. The output of this re-verification (using the same verification approach) will
yield four outcomes (e.g., good product passes the approach, good product fails the
approach, bad product passes the approach, and bad product fails the approach). The
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logic to calculate the values and the respective probabilities for these four outcomes will
be the same as addressed in outcomes B1through B4.
The same logic is used for the remainder of the rework cycles. In other words, a
product will undergo a rework cycle after a failed verification approach is exhibited. The
outcome of this cycle, whether it’s after the first rework or after the third rework will
generate four outcomes as explained in the description of outcomes B1 through B4. The
value and the probability for each of these depend on the number of reworks, the
expected results, and whether the product is deemed good or bad. Therefore, the value of
a good product that passes will include a benefit and a post production cost in addition to
the cost of the reworks (if applicable) and the cost of the verification approach(es). The
value of a bad product that passes will not include the benefits but would include a
consequence variable (CF). The value of a good or bad product that fails after all of the
reworks have been conducted will only consist of the costs of the verification approaches
and the costs of the reworks. These outcomes generate failed items that will not be
fielded. Table 4.1 defines all of the outcomes with specific result details for the
verification of a requirement with three reworks.
Equations (4.10) and (4.11) are used as the basis for calculating each of the
outcomes respective probabilities based on the outcomes specific circumstances (e.g.,
outcome 1 where a good product passes the verification approach, and outcome 2 where a
good product fails a verification approach and reworked yielding a good product that
passes the verification approach). Table 4.1 defines all of the outcomes for the
verification of a requirement with three reworks. The probabilities are derived by using
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the nomenclature in Table 4.1 as guidance. The column “first product condition” applies
to the expected condition (probability) of the product going into the verification approach
(e.g., P(G) is the probability that the product is good). The column “first approach result”
applies to the conditional probability of the product passing or failing given that the
product is good or bad, based on the first product condition’s column. The probability
for each of the outcomes is the product of the respective outcome’s probabilities for that
outcome. For example, in outcome 1, the first product condition is “good” and the first
approach result is a “pass”. This implies that for that outcome, the “product condition” is
the probability of the product being good (P(G)). As previously stated, P(G) is as an
input variable by the decision maker. The “pass” entry in the first approach results
column indicates the conditional probability of the product passing the approach, given
that the product is good. This conditional probability is also an input entry by the
decision maker, as previously stated. The probability for outcome 1 then is the product
of those two probabilities.
The second product condition column implies the expected condition (probability)
of the product after it was subjected to a rework cycle. The second approach results
column is the conditional probability of the product passing or failing the approach, given
that the product is good or bad. The third and fourth product condition and approach
results columns are similar for the expected results after the second and third rework
cycles. All of these probabilities are input entries by the decision maker, as previously
stated.
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Once each of the outcome’s value and probabilities have been calculated (for each
of the verification approaches), the expected value for each verification approach is
calculated based on equation (4.9). These expected values are compared and the
approach with the highest expected value is deemed as the preferred verification
approach for that requirement.

4.2.2.2 Step Two, Multi-Requirement logic.
The logic for two or more requirements is a little different than the logic used for
one requirement. Since the second-to-last requirement yielded a number of outcomes
that passed good products and passed bad products, the outcomes for the last requirement
will be different. For a good product that passed the second to last requirement only
outcomes 1 – 23 in Table 4.1 will be applicable. The value for each of these 23 outcomes
is calculated very similar to the values calculated in section 4.2.2.1. Equation (4.7) is
modified to account for the value of a good product passing and failing the respective
outcomes. The outcomes that ultimately pass a verification approach will contain the
costs associated with the approach (multiplied by the number of times the approach was
executed), plus the rework costs (if applicable), plus the post verification costs, plus the
benefits. Using equation (4.7), these values are then calculated with the following
equation.

Vpass│good = n*Cost of approach + m*CW + CP + B,
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Table 4.1. Outcome Descriptors
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where n is the number of times the verification approach was conducted, the approach
cost is either CT or CA, and m is the number of reworks that were conducted, CW is the
rework cost, CP is the post verification cost, and B is the benefit. The probabilities for
these outcomes are also calculated the same way as described in section 4.2.2.1.
For the outcomes that ultimately fail a verification approach, the value of these
will contain the costs associated with the approach (multiplied by the number of times the
verification approach was executed), plus the rework costs (if applicable). These
outcomes will yield products that will not be fielded and thus only the costs associated
with the execution of the approach and the reworks are included. Modifying equation
(4.7), these values are then calculated with the following equation.

Vfail│good = n*Cost of approach + m*CW,

where n is the number of times the verification approach was conducted, cost of the
approach is either CT or CA, m is the number of reworks that were conducted, and CW is
the rework cost. The probabilities for these outcomes are also calculated the same way as
described in section 4.2.2.1.
A bad product that passed the second to last requirement will have different
outcomes since it is assumed that it remains a bad product for the remainder of the
verification, even if it passes the last requirement. The assumption is that a product that
is subjected to a verification approach to verify one requirement and passes will be
subjected to a verification approach to verify the next requirement only. The previous
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requirement, since the product passed it, will not be re-verified. The last requirement in a
sequence is therefore calculated based on a bad product even if a rework is conducted
when a failure occurs. This last requirement will have 5 outputs for a 3 rework situation,
as shown in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4, Logic for Passing a Bad Product

The value for each of these five outcomes (except for outcome 46) is calculated
using equation (4.7) with the benefit (B) as zero. A bad product in the field will not have
any benefits. Equation (4.7) is modified to reflect passing these bad products.

Vpass│bad = n*Cost of approach + m*CW + CP + CF,
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where n is the number of times the verification approach was conducted, cost of the
approach is either CT or CA, m is the number of reworks that were conducted, CW is the
rework cost, CP is the post verification cost, and CF is the cost of having a failed product
in the field
The value for outcome 46 is calculated using the following equation

Vfail│good = n*Cost of approach + m*CW,

where n is the number of times the verification approach was conducted, cost of the
approach is either CT or CA, m is the number of reworks that were conducted, and CW is
the rework cost.
The probabilities for these five outcomes are also calculated the same way as
described in section 4.2.2.1 and are as follows:

Probabilityoutcome 24 = P (B) * P (1st pass│B),
Probabilityoutcome 36 = P (B) * P (1st fail│B) * P (2nd pass│B and 1st fail),
Probabilityoutcome 42 = P (B) * P (1st fail│B) * P (2nd fail│B and 1st fail) *
P (3rd pass│B and 1st fail and 2nd fail),
Probabilityoutcome 45 = P (B) * P (1st fail│B) * P (2nd fail│B and 1st fail) *
P (3rd fail│B and 1st fail and 2nd fail) *
P (4th pass│B and 1st fail and 2nd fail and 3rd fail),
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Probabilityoutcome 46 = P (B) * P (1st fail│B) * P (2nd fail│B and 1st fail) *
P (3rd fail│B and 1st fail and 2nd fail) *
P (4th fail│B and 1st fail and 2nd fail and 3rd fail),

where P(B) is the probability of a bad product, P (fail│B) is the conditional probability
that a product fails given that it is bad, and P (pass│B) is the conditional probability that
a product passes, given it is bad.
The values and probabilities are calculated for all outcomes (for each of the
verification approaches), as an input to the expected value for each verification approach
based on equation (4.9). These expected values are compared and the approach with the
highest expected value is deemed as the preferred verification approach for the last
requirement.
To address the dependence of the expected value between requirements, the
numerical amount of the approach with the greatest expected value is used as an input to
the value equation for each outcome of the previous requirement that passed a
verification approach in Table 4.1. The expected value for each approach of the last
requirement is calculated first. The approach with the greatest expected value is the
preferred approach for that requirement and its numerical number is used in the previous
requirement as an input as provided in equation (4.12).
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Equation (4.7) is therefore tailored to

Vx-1 = n*Cost of approach + m*CW + (highest E (V) of the next requirement) (4.12)

where x is the next requirement to be verified, n is the number of times the verification
approach was conducted, cost of the approach is either CT or CA, m is the number of
reworks that was conducted, and CW is the rework cost.
The values calculated for each outcome of the second to last requirement using
equation (4.12) and the associated probabilities for each outcome as described in section
4.2.2.1 are used to determine the expected value for each approach of the second to last
requirement using equation (4.9). These are compared and the approach with the highest
expected value is deemed as the preferred approach for this second to last requirement.
The logic used for the preceding requirement is the same.

4.3 Summary
This chapter defined the VCRVM and provided an insight into the methodologies
construct. While it seems that the calculations and inputs can be overwhelming,
especially as the number of requirements is increased, computer tools like Excel can
alleviate this concern. In addition, based on the literature search, requirements that have
verification flexibility (i.e., verification by testing or by analysis) are minimal.
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As previously stated, all inputs required in the VCRVM have uncertainty. Cost
and benefit estimates are predictions and derived by estimating methods that have been
known to have variances (i.e., actual costs versus estimated cost). The input probabilities
are based on the decision makers and the subject matter expert’s knowledge of the
product, its complexity, maturity, and previous pedigree data, as well as the vendor’s
technical ability. While the conglomeration of this information is vital in managing and
assessing a program’s verification strategy, it is still a subjective input.
In order to address these uncertainties and better understand the drivers that affect
the preferred strategy, different techniques or tools are used in a developed model, like
Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis. Monte Carlo simulation is a technique
that repeatedly samples variables’ probability distributions resulting in a large number of
possible outcomes. These results provide an insight into the probability of the occurrence
of certain outcomes. Sensitivity analysis is a technique that determines what variables
have the greatest or the least impact on an outcome. The VCRVM can be subjected to
either or both techniques to provide an insight on the input’s uncertainty and their effects
on the overall verification strategy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
APPLICATION

This chapter addresses the application of the VCRVM defined in chapter 4, in two
examples to show how the methodology could be used. The first example will address
the requirement verification decision logic using two requirements. The results of the
VCRVM will be compared to a typical DoD decision making methodology (i.e., business
case analysis) typically used for this type of evaluation. The data is notional but it is
supported by realistic inputs. The second example will address a representative decision
faced in the DoD (i.e., deciding between four companies to develop a missile system).
This example will also address a comparison of a business case analysis to a tailored
VCRVM. Both examples will demonstrate the benefits of pursuing the VCRVM along
with currently used metrics to provide decision makers a holistic view of the decision
landscape in order to assist them in making better informed decisions.

5.1 Battery Example
As previously mentioned, each situation is different and the VCRVM should be
tailored to address the specific circumstances. The following is a simple example that
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illustrates and explains the use of the VCRVM. The product is a lithium-ion battery used
in launched vehicle applications. The technology is an evolving technology in the
commercial sector and has many applications in the defense industry. This type of
battery is advantageous over typical batteries due to its “full electrical performance,
including voltage regulation and capacity which can be directly verified on the flight
hardware prior to use” (U.S. Air Force Space Command 2008, 1). This Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) standard defines typical requirements and verification
approaches necessary to “assure successful battery operation during launches to space.”
This example adapts two requirements from the SMC Standard that have the option to
use either test or analysis to verify the battery.

5.1.1


Requirements
R-1: Storage Temperature. “A storage temperature test or analysis shall be
performed to demonstrate that the battery will not be damaged by the maximum
predicted high and low storage temperatures with margin (generally 10°C
recommended)” (U.S. Air Force Space Command 2008, 31).



R-2: Acoustic: “Test or analysis shall be performed to demonstrate that a battery
can withstand the acoustic environment expected during launch with margin of 6
dB above MPE for 3 min in each axis” (U.S. Air Force Space Command 2008,
35).
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5.1.2


Ground Rules and Assumptions
All costs, consequences, and benefits monetary amounts are in current year
dollars.



The expected condition (probability) of the battery being “good” is the same
throughout the model. A degradation factor is used to decrement this probability
after each rework cycle.



A rework cycle, in this example, implies that the failed product will be reworked
to the next-best design available (four design maximum). In other words, it is
assumed that the battery manufacturer originally came up with four possible
designs. The best design was developed into a product that was subjected to a
verification approach. Once a failure occurs, that design is deemed not valid and
the next-best design is used to develop a battery which is subjected to a
verification approach. If that battery fails, the next-best design is used until all
designs are exhausted. At that time, the battery is deemed not viable and the
program ends (i.e., program is terminated). This assumption is valid for products
such as batteries where the composition of the battery cells in conjunction with
other components (e.g., fuses, resistors, sensors, and thermal switches) tends to be
a complex design process that usually leads to more than one design. This
assumption was used rather than a typical rework loop to address other possible
options that can be used with the VCRVM. A maximum of 3 rework cycles will
be done. A degradation factor will be used to decrement each successive “nextdesign” to account for the hierarchy of the product’s ability to meet the battery’s
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requirements. In other words, the battery’s original four designs were ranked
from best to worst. The best design was deemed as having the highest probability
of meeting the requirements. The next-best design would have a lower
probability and so on. The probability for each of the designs is calculated based
on the following equation (5.1) to account for a design degradation (i.e., second
design is worse than the first).

Design n = αn,

(5.1)

where n is the design number in terms of best to worse (i.e., one being the best),
and α is the degradation factor. For example, the best design has a probability of
one that is going to meet the requirements. The next-best design has a probability
of 0.95, the design after that would have a probability of 0.90, and so on. The
degradation factor is an input to the model by the decision maker along with
subject matter experts based on their understanding of the design complexity and
vendor’s technical ability.


The cost estimate of the redesign cycle is the same every time it is performed
regardless if it fails a test or an analysis. As previously stated, rework or redesign
costs could be different for every rework cycle depending on the situation.
However, since the next-best design is being used in this example, it is assumed
that the redesign costs are the same. A battery that fails based on an analysis will
utilize the next-best design just the same as a battery that fails via a test.
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The cost estimate to conduct an analysis on the same requirement is the same.
Depending on the situation, documentation development cost and perhaps model
development cost may be different each time an analysis is conducted, especially
between the first and subsequent analysis (e.g., the costs to develop the models
and set up tools would be higher on the first analysis than the latter ones). For
this example, it is assumed that model development costs are not applicable and
only minimal differences exist between the first analytical evaluation and the rest.



Each requirement will have different estimated analytical costs. The costs
associated with analyzing one requirement (e.g., storage temperature) are different
than the costs associated with analyzing another requirement (e.g., acoustic
environment). Different personnel (i.e., different disciplines) are required,
different duration, and depending on the situation, different models and tools will
need to be executed to properly verify that the product (e.g., battery) meets the
proper requirement. Thus, requirement one will have its own analytical cost (CA1), and requirement two will have its own analytical cost (CA-2), as shown on
Table 5.1.



The cost estimate to execute a test on the same requirement is the same. The
same rationale is used for this assumption as that of the previous analytical cost
estimate assumption.



Each requirement will have different estimated test costs. The same rationale is
used for this assumption as that of the previous assumption for the analytical cost
estimate for each requirement.
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Once a rework is conducted, the same verification approach will be used to reverify the battery.



If a bad battery passes a requirement, all subsequent approaches will maintain the
bad hardware status, even if a rework is done to address a subsequent failure.
This statement assumes that if a bad product passes a requirement, that
requirement will not be verified in the subsequent requirement verification cycle
and thus will be a bad product regardless of the outcome.



The requirements stated in the SMC standard are correct. That is, requirements
used to design or build the hardware meet the objectives of the product.



A test failure will not include costs associated with test facility damage or other
test assets, nor loss of life. These costs are out of the control of the program
office.



Costs and probabilities are subjective but based on professional experience and as
derived in the following section.

5.1.3

Approach
The logic used in this example is based on the logic developed in Chapter 4. An

Excel spreadsheet was used to develop the model. This model consists of two
requirements with associated costs, benefits, and probabilities as input variables. The
output of the model illustrates the preferred (highest expected value) approach to use for
each requirement.
The uncertainty surrounding the monetary estimates (cost, consequences, and
benefits) is addressed by defining each of these factors as random variables. The
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Palisade’s @RISK software tool (Palisade Model 2005) was used to run a Monte Carlo
simulation addressing these uncertainties within the model. A triangular distribution was
used for each cost and the benefit based on Table 5.1.

5.1.4

Inputs
Table 5.1 summarizes the inputs used in the model. A description of each input is

also described with rationale for each entry is presented in the following paragraphs.


COSTS:
The cost associated with verifying the battery to each requirement (via
analysis or test) is different. Since this cost is an estimate only, uncertainty is
addressed by assuming a probability distribution associated with this cost. A
triangular distribution was used, for simplicity.
o CA - 1: Cost of performing the analysis to verify the battery to
Requirement 1, Storage Temperature. This includes looking at the design
paperwork (15 hours), examining data (10 hours), conducting specific
analysis (system engineering, statistical, modeling and simulation (20
hours)), and assessing lower level data (5 hours). It also includes peer and
program reviews and conduct (5 hours) as well as documenting the
findings (5 hours). Models that constitute charging the customer (i.e., the
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Table 5.1 Battery Example Inputs
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Government) were not used. These costs were calculated as follows:


Using equation (4.1),

CA = ∑ (hours * rate) + ∑ (hours * model cost rate).
CA = 60 hours at $150/hour = $9,000,

where the rate estimate is derived from similar analysis conducted on
missile programs. It includes overhead rates, fees, administrative factors,
and profit.

o CA - 2: Cost of the analysis to verify the battery to Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration. This includes looking at the design paperwork
(20 hours), examining data (30 hours), conducting specific analysis
(system engineering, statistical, modeling and simulation (40 hours)), and
assessing lower level data (15 hours). It also includes peer and program
reviews and conduct (10 hours) as well as documenting the findings (5
hours). Models that constitute charging the customer (i.e., the
Government) were not used. These costs were calculated as follows:


Using equation (4.1),

CA = ∑ (hours * rate) + ∑ (hours * model cost rate).
CA = 120 hours at $150/hour = $18,000,
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where the rate estimate is derived from analysis conducted on
similar missile programs. It includes overhead rates, fees,
administrative factors, and profit.

o CT - 1 - Cost of the testing to verify the battery to Requirement 1, Storage
Temperature. The costs were calculated as follows:


Cost of the test article: The cost of the first battery going through
verification is tied to the research and development costs that, if
used, could offset the results of the model. Thus, it is assumed that
the cost of the article is the Designed to Unit Production Cost.
This cost is regarded as the average cost of the procurement
quantity. The cost of the article itself is minimal compared to the
overall cost and thus it does not make a difference. Assume the
cost of the article as $1000.



Cost of the test set up (e.g., prepare environmental chamber
including data retrieving tools) = 40 hours.



Documentation (e.g., prepare specific test plan (assume
independent test plan (40 hours)), review test results (30 hours),
and document in report (10 hours)) = 80 hours.



Conduct of the test (e.g., soak battery to low temperature (assume
24 hours of soak time and execute test), gather data, and analyze
and evaluate the data (56 hours) = 80 hours.



Reviews (e.g., pre and post-test reviews) - 8 hours.
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Total costs (2 times (one cold and one hot) the costs of the articles
plus set up and test conduct). In addition, the costs of
documentation, and reviews.
Using equation (4.2),

CT = ∑ (hours * rate) + ∑ (equipment, facility cost) +
∑ (auxiliary cost).
CT-1 = [2 * (1000 + (40 at $150 per hour) +
(80 at $150 per hour)] + (80 at $150 per hour) +
(8 at $150 per hour) = $51,200,
where the rate estimate is derived from similar analysis conducted on
missile programs. It includes overhead rates, fees, administrative factors,
and profit.

o CT - 2 - Cost of testing to verify the battery to Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration. These costs were calculated as follows:


Cost of the article = $1000



Cost of the test set up (e.g., prepare vibration table including data
retrieving tools) - 80 hours.
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Documentation (e.g., prepare specific test plan (assume
independent test plan), review test results and document in report)
- 120 hours.



Conduct of the test (e.g., calibrate vibration table with mock-up
battery (3 axes), gather, review, and evaluate data and recalibrate if
needed, conduct test with battery (3 axes) - 320 hours.



Reviews (pre and post-test reviews) - 8 hours.

Using equation (4.2),
CT = ∑ (hours * rate) + ∑ (equipment, facility cost) +
∑ (auxiliary cost).
CT = $1000 + 528hrs * $150/hr = $80,200,
where the rate estimate is derived from similar analysis conducted on
missile programs. It includes overhead rates, fees, administrative factors,
and profit.

o CW – Costs due to battery having failed a verification approach (test or
analysis) and subjected to the rework loop. Once a failure occurs (analysis
or test), the costs associated with the failure analysis and corrective action
with the associated documentation and peer review and conduct are
included in these costs. These failures are assumed to be failures
attributed to a design flaw not a workmanship defect or poor part quality.
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The cost associated with the rework loop is the same for each requirement
regardless of the approach. These costs were calculated as follows:


Failure Analysis Cost - 320 hours (assume once a failure occurs, it
takes 2 weeks to conduct the failure analysis and 4 personnel)



Corrective Action (implementing the corrective action into the
design will yield the second best design) - 240 hours (assume the
corrective action implementation takes 2 weeks and 3 personnel).



Material costs are assumed to zero or sunk costs. In other words,
the development program (prior to verification) designed four
batteries. In this assumption, the material costs associated with
these designs were incurred prior to the verification start, otherwise
a schedule slip would be realized if a failure occurred, especially if
long-lead items are used in the batteries. This is a prudent
approach used by program managers and vendors.



Documentation is done in parallel to the failure analysis and
corrective action implementation. Thus, from a schedule
standpoint, no time is lost but the costs of documentation (80 hours
at $150/hour) will still need to be accounted for separately.



Reviews (480 hours at $150 per hour = $72,000). A failure during
verification could be very visible in terms of the chain of command
and the interest that it has based on the program. It is not
uncommon to have daily reviews (1 hour) with a selective few and
a longer review (2 – 4 hours) weekly with the stakeholders until
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the failure is identified, the corrective action is selected, and
implementation is complete). Thus for a 4 week session (assume 4
weeks to conduct the failure review and implement the corrective
action) the following is a breakdown of the possible hours:


4 weeks (5 days/week) at 1 hour per review (16 hours (other
four days are for the longer reviews) with 5 – 10 personnel) =
160 hours



4 longer review with 20 personnel at 4 hours each = 320 hours



The costs associated with preparing the review materials are
included in the respective costs of the failure analysis and
corrective action buckets.



The difference in pay grade is assumed to be the same and an
average of $150 per hour encompasses this difference in
addition to the inclusion of overhead rates, fees, administrative
factors, and profit.

Using equation (4.3),

CW = ∑ (hours * rate) + ∑ (equipment, facility cost).
CW = 1040 hours at $150/hr = $156,000.

o CP – Cost of post verification activities once the battery is successfully
verified. This cost assumes that the batteries are going to be part of a
launch vehicle. For this application, the launch vehicle is a defensive
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missile capable of intercepting and destroying a rogue missile. The costs
of integrating the battery into this vehicle, testing it, transporting it to the
field location and maintaining it along with its operation costs could be in
the millions. For this example, a conservative number of $75 million is
assumed.



CONSEQUENCES (CF) – Cost of having a bad missile in the field. Once a
“bad” battery passes, it is then integrated into a missile and fielded. It is assumed
that this “bad” battery fails in the field. The costs associated with this category
include the cost of the vehicle(s), the costs associated with the operation, failure
investigation, costs to retrofit all of the missiles to replace the batteries, retesting
costs, and political support. These costs could be in the millions or billions. For
this exercise it is assumed that the costs are $50 million.



BENEFITS (B) – The benefits associated with a good battery successfully passing
verification. The benefits have to do with the objectives of the product and/or the
program. For this example, the product which is part of a missile defense system
is required to protect an area from an incoming missile threat. The benefits are
then calculated based on the protection that this missile has. Quantifying this
benefit is done based on the cost of not protecting the city. Assume that the
protective area is that of a mid size city with a population of 417,000. The EPA's
estimate of $7.4 million per Life (2006 Fiscal Year dollars) was used and an
assumption of 40 percent of the population survives. Therefore, 250,200 deaths at
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$7.4million/person = $1.85 trillion (2006 Fiscal Year dollars). The infrastructure
cost is small compared to the life estimate. Using equation (4.6),

B = ∑ (technical characteristics) + ∑ (programmatic characteristics) +
∑ (political characteristics) = $1.85 trillion,

where only the technical characteristics were used in this simple example.



PROBABILITIES
These probabilities, as discussed earlier, are based on the decision maker
and the subject matter expert’s subjective assessment of the product’s (e.g.,
battery) technical maturity, complexity, and experience from similar programs,
the products development pedigree, and the vendor’s technical knowledge and
experience. For this example, since the battery is being used in the commercial
sector, the probabilities that follow should be high to account for the vendor’s
ability to design and develop a similar product. The battery will encounter
different and not-yet-verified environmental effects and thus, the respective
probabilities for each approach (i.e., testing and analysis) and for each
requirement will vary slightly. The specific numerical values will be subjected to
sensitivity analysis to understand how they affect the overall result.

o PG – Probability of a good design/hardware: This probability is
subjective but the decision maker usually has a good idea of what this
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value is given a number of variables such as the technology maturity, the
vendor, and the application. He/she also assumes that by the time the
product is ready to enter the verification process; there has been enough
discipline to do things the right way, follow the applicable processes and
procedures, and have a solid design going forward to verification. Thus,
this probability is determined to be high. For this exercise, the battery
(lithium-ion) technology is up-and-coming and based on the commercial
use of the technology, the probability chosen is 0.95.
o P-A-1 – Probability that a good battery will pass Requirement 1, Storage
Temperature, by analysis. Each requirement to be verified is different and
each probability associated with the battery passing that requirement is
also different no matter if it is verified via analysis or test. Since it is
assumed that verifying a battery by testing will be more thorough than by
analysis, the probability that it passes by analysis will be higher than the
probability that it passes by testing. Thus, P-A-1 = 0.93. The 0.93 was
determined based on the assumption that this battery technology is a new
technology being developed for space applications and while it is currently
being used in the commercial sector, the storage temperature effects on
this battery design is unknown.
o P-A-2 - Probability that a good battery will pass Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration, by analysis. The transportation vibration
environment is assumed to be similar from that of the batteries used in the
commercial sector, except for the interface effects between the battery and
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the missile while being transported in a container or a carrier vehicle.
Thus, the 0.94 value is slightly higher than that of requirement one.
P-A-2 = 0.94
o P-T-1 - Probability that a good battery will pass Requirement 1, Storage
Temperature, by testing. As previously stated, testing is more rigorous
than analysis and since the storage temperature environment is assumed to
be more severe than that of the batteries in the commercial sector, a lower
probability than that of the analysis is selected.
P-T-1 = 0.90
o P-T-2 - Probability that a good battery will pass Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration, by testing. Transportation vibration testing is
more rigorous than analysis and since the interface vibration effects on the
battery are different, a lower probability than that of the analysis is
selected.
P-T-2 = 0.91
o P-R-A-1 – Probability that a bad battery will fail Requirement 1, Storage
Temperature, by analysis. Each requirement to be verified is different and
each probability that a specific requirement will pass or fail will also be
different no matter if it is done via analysis or test. Since it is assumed
that verifying a requirement by testing will be more thorough in exercising
the hardware than via analysis only, the probability that a bad hardware
fails by testing will be higher than the probability that it fails by analysis.
P-R-A-1 = 0.95
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o P-R-A-2 - Probability that a bad battery will fail Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration, by analysis.
P-R-A-2 = 0.96
o P-R-T-1 - Probability that a bad battery will fail Requirement 1, Storage
Temperature, by testing.
P-R-T-1 = 0.97
o P-R-T-2 - Probability that a bad battery will fail Requirement 2,
Transportation Vibration, by testing.
P-R-T-2 = 0.98
o α - The rework/redesign degradation factor. This degradation factor is
used to decrement each successive “next-best design” to account for the
hierarchy of the battery’s ability to meet the requirements. As previously
stated, the degradation factor is based on a subjective assessment of the
design maturity, complexity, and the vendor’s technical ability. Since the
battery is being used in the commercial sector, the degradation factor
should be high to account for the vendor’s ability to design and develop a
similar product. While the battery will encounter different environmental
effects, the fundamental design should be similar to that of the commercial
battery and slight battery cell composition and packaging may be needed
to account for these environmental effects.
α = 0.95
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5.1.5

Logic
Per section 4.2.2.2, the value for outcomes 1 – 23 from Table 4.1 are calculated

for the second requirement using equation (4.7) and the inputs in Table (5.1). The
probabilities are also calculated using equations (4.10) and (4.11) as the basis and as
described in section 4.2.2.1. Note: the degradation factor is being used in this example
to account for the next best design available after a rework cycle.
First, the analysis approach is calculated. From Table 4.1, the following
illustrates how the values and the probabilities are calculated.


Outcome 1. Good product passed requirement 2 by analysis.
Voutcome 1 = 1 * (-18000) + 0 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
0 * (-50 X 106) + (1.85 X 1012) = $1.85 x 10 12.
Probabilityoutcome 1 = P (Good product and passed) = 0.95 * 0.94 = 0.893.



Outcome 2. Good product failed requirement 2 by analysis and passed after
reworked given rework yielded a good product.
Voutcome 2 = 2 * (-18000) + 1 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
0 * (-50 X 106) + (1.85 X 1012) = $1.85 x 10 12.
Probabilityoutcome 2 = P (Good product and failed requirement 2 by analysis
and good product after rework (with a degradation factor allocated) and
passed requirement 2 by analysis) = 0.95 *(1-0.94)*0.95*0.95*0.94 =
0.048.
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Outcome 3. Good product failed requirement 2 by analysis and failed again after
it was reworked once and passed after the second rework.
Voutcome 3 = 3 * (-18000) + 2 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
0 * (-50 X 106) + (1.85 X 1012) = $1.85 x 10 12.
Probabilityoutcome 3 = P (Good product and failed requirement 2 by analysis
and good product after first rework (with a degradation factor allocated)
and failed requirement 2 by analysis and good product after the second
rework (with a second degradation factor allocated) and passed
requirement 2 by analysis) = 0.95 * (1-0.94) * 0.95 * 0.95 * (1 - 0.94) *
0.95 * 0.952 * 0.94 = 0.003.
The value and probabilities for outcomes 4 through 23 were derived the same

way. Per section 4.2.2.2, the probabilities and the values for the five outcomes (outcome
24, 36, 42, 45, and 46 from Table 4.1) that resulted from a bad product going into the
verification of requirement 2 were derived using equation (4.7) and the logic in section
4.2.2.2, as follows for the analysis approach:


Outcome 24. Bad product passed requirement 2 by analysis.
Voutcome 24 = 1 * (-18000) + 0 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
(-50 X 106) + 0 * (1.85 X 1012) = - $1.25 X 108.
Probabilityoutcome 24 = P (Good product and passed)
= (1- 0.95) * (1 - 0.96) = 0.002.
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Outcome 36. Bad product failed requirement 2 by analysis but passed after the
rework cycle.
Voutcome 36 = 2 * (-18000) + 1 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
(-50 X 106) + 0 * (1.85 X 1012) = - $1.25 X 108.
Probabilityoutcome 36 = (1- 0.95) * (0.96) * (1 - 0.96) = 0.0019.



Outcome 42. Bad product failed requirement 2 by analysis but passed after two
rework cycles.
Voutcome 42 = 3 * (-18000) + 2 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
(-50 X 106) + 0 * (1.85 X 1012) = - $1.25 X 108.
Probabilityoutcome 42 = (1- 0.95) * (0.96) * (0.96) * (1 - 0.96) = 0.0018.



Outcome 45. Bad product failed requirement 2 by analysis but passed after three
rework cycles.
Voutcome 45 = 4 * (-18000) + 3 * (-156,000) + (-75 X 106) +
(-50 X 106) + 0 * (1.85 X 1012) = - $1.26 X 108.
Probabilityoutcome 45 = (1-0.95) * (0.96) * (0.96) * (0.96) * (1 - 0.96) =
0.0018.



Outcome 46. Bad product failed requirement 2 by analysis and failed after three
rework cycles.
Voutcome 45 = 4* (-18000) + 3 * (-156,000) = - $540,000.
Probabilityoutcome 46 = (1-0.95) * (0.96) * (0.96) * (0.96) * (0.96) = 0.0425.
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For the analysis approach, the expected value for requirement 2 was calculated
using equation (4.9),
E (V) analysis = (1.85 x 1012) * (0.893) + (1.85 x 1012) * (0.048) +
(1.85 x 10 12) * (0.003) + …
E (V) analysis =

$ 1.8487 X 1012 .

The Expected value for the test approach was derived the same way.
E (V) test = $ 1.8479 X 1012.
Based on these expected values, analysis is the preferred approach for the second
requirement.
For requirement 1, equation (4.12) was used to calculate the values of the
outcomes listed in Table 4.1 for the analysis approach.
Vx-1 = n * Cost of approach + m * CW +
(highest E(V) amount of the next requirement).


Outcome 1. Good product passed requirement 1 by analysis.
Voutcome 1 = 1 * (-9000) + 0*(-512000) + (1.8487 X 1012) = $1.8487 X 1012.
Probabilityoutcome 1 = P (Good product and passed) = 0.95*0.93 = 0.8835.
Outcomes 2 thru 46 were derived the same way.
Based on these calculations, the expected value of requirement 1 for the analysis

approach was derived using equation (4.9),
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E (V)analysis = (1.8487 X 1012) * (0.8835) + …
E (V)analysis = $1.8412 X 1012.
The Expected value for the test approach was derived the same way.
E (V)test = $1.8420 X 1012.
Based on these expected values, test is the preferred approach for requirement 1.
Thus, the preferred strategy is to conduct a test for requirement 1 and to do an analysis
for requirement 2.

5.1.6

Results
The results of the VCRVM model show that the preferred verification strategy is

to conduct a test for requirement 1 and to do an analysis for requirement 2. The preferred
approach is based on the highest expected value of each approach. The rationale to
conduct a test to verify that the battery meets the first requirement is not obvious as
testing is more expensive than analysis and the probabilities associated with passing a test
over an analysis are lower. However, the VCRVM does not just incorporate the cost and
the probability of passing a test, it includes all of the possible outcomes with the
associated probabilities, the benefits, and the consequences to yield a comprehensive
value.
The example provided verification approach costs orders of magnitude lower than
the post verification costs or consequence costs. In addition, these were also very low as
compared to the benefits incurred if a battery is successfully verified. Thus, the logical
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question is, does it matter that the costs are so widely different? The model was initially
evaluated using a Monte Carlo simulation varying the costs and the benefits per Table 5.1
to yield these results (i.e., conduct a test for requirement 1 and do an analysis for
requirement 2). The model was further refined to alter the costs one at a time to twice
their respective amounts (e.g., cost of the analysis for requirement 1 was doubled to
$18,000) yielding the same output (i.e., conduct a test for requirement 1 and do an
analysis for requirement 2). Furthermore, these costs were also zeroed, one at a time with
the same outcome (i.e., conduct a test for requirement 1 and do an analysis for
requirement 2). This assessment implies that the VCRVM, for this example, is not
sensitive to cost.
The model was also modified to alter the benefit number to twice its original
number (i.e., $3.7X1012 ) yielding the same results (i.e., conduct a test for requirement 1
and do an analysis for requirement 2). Interesting enough, at a lower benefit number (i.e.,
$37 million) the preferred strategy changed to the conduct of analysis for both
requirements. The principal reason for this change is that very low benefits coupled with
lower cost and high probabilities for analysis over testing, the analysis value becomes
dominant in the model. The $37 million, based on the initial benefit number of $1.85
trillion is very small (0.002 percent) and thus, it could be assumed that the preferred
strategy is not sensitive to the benefits.
The model was also modified to explore the sensitivity of one or more of the
probabilities on the overall output. First, each probability was incrementally changed
from zero to one and holding all others constant to find the point where it affected the
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output. The results are shown in Figure 5.1. Secondly, two probabilities were varied
simultaneously (i.e., plus and minus 20 percent of the mean) to determine their
simultaneous effect on the overall output. Results are shown in Table 5.2.

Figure 5.1, Sensitivity Analysis Results
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As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the preferred verification strategy (e.g., highest
expected value) is sensitive to most probabilities. This is not surprising as the bulk of
these probabilities are very close to each other and because the probability of each of the
outcomes is the product of two or more probabilities, as previously discussed. As one
probability value changes, it affects the overall probability of the outcome. Figure 5.1
depicts a preference change at a certain probability, by the change in color. For example,
for the PG (i.e., probability that the product is good) row, the preferred verification
strategy (i.e., highest expected value) is test for the first requirement and analysis for the
second requirement (i.e., labeled TA) when the PG value is between zero and 0.97. At
higher probabilities (e.g., PG greater than 0.97, the preferred strategy (i.e., highest
expected value) will be to conduct an analysis on both requirements. This makes sense
since this probability (PG) is a factor of the conditional probability of passing, given it is
a good battery and the conditional probability is higher for analysis than for testing.
The same logic (i.e., color change) applies to the other rows in Figure 5.1. As can
be seen in the figure, lowering the probabilities of the analysis inputs for the first
requirement (PA-1, PRA-1) does not change the preferred strategy. At lower analysis
probabilities, the test probabilities are dominant and thus will maintain the preferred
strategy of testing for the first requirement. When the analysis probabilities (PA-2 and
PRA-2) are lowered for the second requirement, the same rationale applies. The test
probabilities will be dominant and influence the results of the strategy. At higher
analysis probabilities, these will dominate the model. Dominance is meant to define the
overall logic of the model and what drives it (e.g., probability), not that there is a one-to130

one correlation between an analysis probability and a test probability. In other words, if
the probability that a product will pass a verification approach by analysis is much lower
than by the testing approach, then the expected outcome of the VCRVM (all other things
being equal) will be by testing.
Lowering the probabilities of the test inputs for the first requirement (PT-1 and
PRT-1), results in a change to the preferred strategy from testing the first requirement to
the conduct of analysis. This makes sense since the probability of passing the
verification by analysis is higher at those instances. On the second requirement, lowering
the probabilities of testing does not result in a change in strategy since a lower testing
probability will result in a higher analysis probability.
Lowering the “α” input changes the preferred strategy to verifying the battery via
analytical means for both requirements. This makes sense since decreasing the “α” value
also decreases the conditional probabilities (passing, given it is a good product and
failing, given it is a good product) after the rework cycles. These rework cycles are a
result of failing with a probability that is less for analysis than for testing and thus,
analysis will be dominant.
Table 5.2 illustrates the preferred strategy varying two probabilities
simultaneously. For example, the first 4 rows under the heading “PG” implies that the
probability of the product being good (i.e., PG) was changed to a minimum and a
maximum (i.e., low implies 80 percent of the baseline value and high implies 120 percent
of the baseline value or 100 percent). Baseline in this context is defined as the initial
probability input for the respective probability (e.g., 0,95 is the initial baseline for PG).
131

The columns on the right of the figure (e.g., PA-1 though PRT-2) imply that each of these
probabilities were changed along with PG. The entry in the intersection of one
probability (and level) and the other refers to the preferred strategy. The row entries for
low and high under the “2nd Prob” column heading implies that the second probability
will be varied along with the first one by the respective percentages (i.e., low implies 80
percent of the baseline value and high implies 120 percent of the baseline value or 100
percent). For example, under the PG heading column, the low probability row along with
the low probability row of the 2nd Prob. column for PA-1, the entry at the intersection or
the preferred strategy is to test the first requirement and to conduct an analysis for the
second (i.e., TA). This means that reducing PG to 80 percent of the baseline and
reducing PA-1 to 80 percent of the baseline, the model is run with all other probabilities
constant and the preferred strategy is still testing the first requirement and the conduct of
an analysis for the second one.
The results indicate that simultaneously changing two probability inputs will
affect the preferred strategy substantially depending on the percentage reduction or
increase from the baseline. In other words, decreasing PA-1 to 80 percent of the baseline
will result in a preferred strategy of analysis on the first requirement when PT-1 is also at
80 percent of its baseline. For this particular situation, PT-1 is lower than that of PA-1
and reducing both by 20 percent will not make a difference. But if PA-1 is reduced to 80
percent of the baseline and PT-1 is increased to 120 percent or a probability of one, the
preferred strategy is to test the first requirement. This makes sense since for this
situation; the probability of testing is much higher than that of analysis. The overall take
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away of this two-variable analysis is that for this example, the preferred strategy is
extremely sensitive to probability variations. This is partly due to the fact that the initial
probabilities (e.g., baseline) are so close to each other and due to the interactions of the
model in terms of the expected results for each outcome.

5.1.7

Business Case Analysis Methodology
The business case analysis methodology, referenced in the U.S. Department of

Defense (2007b and 2011a), were used as guidelines in developing the BCA. While the
BCA is not typically used to decide between selecting one verification approach versus
another, it could be useful, especially in documenting the rationale used in deciding
between approaches rather than just making a subjective decision.
A typical BCA entails an assessment of each option, by a multidisciplinary team
of experts, to a set of criteria as defined in the overall objective of the BCA. For this
example, the four options are being contemplated (i.e., each combination of the
approaches). In other words, one option would be to conduct an analysis for both
requirements. Another is to conduct an analysis for one requirement and a test for the
next. A total of four options are possible (i.e., conduct an analyses for both requirements,
conduct an analysis for the first and a test for the second, conduct a test for the first and
an analysis for the second, and conduct a test for both requirements). The BCA
guidelines use a weighting scheme to account for the relative importance of each
assessment factor. An assessment factor for this example is a requirement. Since both
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Table 5.2 Battery Example Probability Sensitivities (Two Probabilities Varied
Simultaneously)
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requirements need to be verified for the battery to pass its verification, these will
be weighted equally. The guidelines also use an assessment score which is the product of
the weight of the assessment factor (e.g., requirement) and the probability that the
requirement will be met by that particular approach. The sum of the assessment scores of
all of the assessment factors (e.g., requirements) is the effectiveness score for that option.
The estimated cost is also calculated for each option based on the cost of the approaches
used for that particular option. The BCA guidelines utilize the effectiveness score and
the cost to show the best approach for that particular situation.

5.1.7.1 Inputs
Table 5.3 illustrates each option’s assessment (i.e., ability to meet the assessment
factor, weight and cost) based on the inputs from Table 5.1.

Table 5.3 BCA (Battery Example Requirements) Inputs
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As previously discussed, the weight of each requirement is equal since both
requirements need to be verified. The probabilities of the four options were taken from
Table 5.1 (i.e., probability that the product passes the approach given that the product is
good). This assumption is valid as decision makers, when faced with this type of
decision; opt to believe that the product going into verification will be good. The cost of
each option is the sum of each option’s respective approach cost. For example, for option
1, the cost of the option is the cost of to verify the product to both requirements by
analysis.

5.1.7.2 BCA Logic and Results
As previously defined, the assessment score is the product of the weight of the
assessment factor (i.e., requirement) and the probability. The effectiveness factor for the
option is the sum of these two assessment scores. Each option is compared based on the
effectiveness factor and the cost of the option as shown in Table 5.4.
For a typical BCA, the decision maker has at his/her disposal a report that
highlights or summarizes the analysis conducted by the BCA team of experts. This
report provides the assumptions used, the logic and rationale for the values used to
develop the BCA, and a set of tables or figures that compare the options based on cost
and the effectiveness factor, such as in Table 5.4 or Figure 5.2.
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Table 5.4 BCA (Battery Example Requirements) Results

Figure 5.2 BCA (Requirements) Results
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For this example, the results are obvious; the lowest cost option with the highest
probabilities (i.e., option 1) is the preferred option. Is this the correct approach? More
often than not, decision makers pressured by cost and schedule concerns, choose this
decision without conducting an analysis like this BCA. It definitely seems like an
attractive option based on the other options much lower effectiveness factors and the
higher cost. However, the effectiveness factor value is a function of the probability (i.e.,
ability to meet the requirement via the respective verification approach). In this example,
the ability to meet the requirement via analysis is higher than by testing which drives the
effectiveness factor. While this is a valid assumption (e.g., test is much more rigorous
and thorough than an analysis), this probability does not take into account the expected
condition of the battery. It assumes that the battery is good.

5.1.7.3 Comparison and discussion
The BCA methodology focuses on cost as an independent variable and a
weighting scheme. For this example, the BCA results show that the selected (i.e., best)
option is dependent on the lowest cost and the probability that the battery passes an
approach given that the battery is good. This methodology, if used by decision makers
for this type of decision, will more than likely support their initial instincts of choosing an
option with the lowest cost. Is this the right approach, however? As previously
discussed, this approach does not take into account a number of attributes (e.g., benefits,
consequences, rework, flawed results, and uncertainty) that could influence the decision.
As demonstrated in the VCRVM, the preferred approach is not to conduct an analysis on
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both requirements, but to conduct a test for requirement 1 and to do an analysis for
requirement 2.
The VCRVM takes into account the expected condition of the battery going into
the verification approach and the possible outcomes coming out of the approach. The
BCA methodology does not. The incorporation of this expected condition (probability)
of the battery going into the approach in the equation is important as no product is 100
percent good. This uncertainty needs to be taken into account, as the VCRVM does. The
possible outcomes coming out of the approach, the benefits, and the consequences are not
addressed in the BCA methodology, like they are in the VCRVM. The BCA assumes a
successful verification. The incorporation of the uncertainty associated with the
verification approach results is important as these will mirror what will more than likely
occur in a real-life verification plan execution. In a typical development program, the
conduct of a verification program will produce failed products after being subjected to
verification approaches, rework opportunities, re-verifications, and bad products being
fielded. The costs for these actions need to be accounted for prior to choosing a strategy.
The VCRVM does just that.

5.2 Comparison of Four Companies for a Missile Development Effort
The previous section provided an example that illustrated the use of the VCRVM
in a requirement verification decision situation. While the example only addressed a
verification decision using two requirements, the logic is applicable to multiple
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requirements. The VCRVM’s capability to be tailored is advantageous not just in
situations with multiple requirements, but in other decision making situations prevalent in
the DoD.
This section provides a comparison of a typical DoD decision making method
(i.e., business case analysis) to the methodology proposed in this dissertation, tailored to
a specific situation. The latter highlights the benefits associated with incorporating the
VCRVM in DoD decision making guidance, not just in requirement verification method
selection decisions. This comparison will be demonstrated using an example with
notional data.
The intent of this example is to illustrate that the VCRVM addressed in this
dissertation can be tailored to other decision situations and can provide valuable
information and results that enhance the current DoD decision-making methods so
decision makers can make better informed decisions. The results of both methods are
presented to illustrate the additional information and benefits the VCRVM has compared
to the DoD’s business case analysis (BCA) methodology.

5.2.1 Scenario
Four companies are evaluated for their ability to meet the six assessment factors
that have been identified as significant in achieving the objectives of the program (i.e.,
fielding a missile defense system to protect a medium size city against a specific threat).
The program is a notional multi-year development program to be fielded by a certain
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timeframe. The product is a notional missile defense system for the Department of
Defense. The six assessment factors are performance and programmatic characteristics
of each company’s ability to meet the program’s objectives. These assessment factors are
the defended area coverage against a specific threat, production rate compliance,
reliability, mission assurance, commonality, and data rights. The factors’ specific
requirements (e.g., reliability of 0.96) do not matter for this example other than whether
the company will meet that factor or not. Therefore, these factors are labeled A through
F within the content of this chapter. The companies will be referred to as options 1
through 4. The decision maker needs to decide what company he/she should pursue.

5.2.2 Approach
The data set for each of the options is notional and is used for both the business
case analysis as well as the tailored VCRVM. The business case analysis methodology,
referenced in the U.S. Department of Defense (2007b and 2011a), were used as
guidelines in developing the BCA. Each option is assessed based on these guidelines.
The VCRVM defined in this dissertation has been tailored to address this situation.

5.2.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions are applicable to both the BCA and the tailored
VCRVM.
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Cost of each option is an estimate of the total program cost adjusted to present
value.



Each assessment factor is evaluated from the point of view that it either meets
the factor or it does not.



All options will have the same schedule.



Risk is incorporated in the assessment of each factor.

5.2.4 Business Case Analysis Methodology
A typical BCA entails an assessment of each option, by a multidisciplinary team
of experts, to a set of criteria as defined in the overall objective of the BCA. For this
example, the criterion is an assessment of each option’s ability to meet each of the six
assessment factors (A through F). The BCA guidelines also use a weighting scheme to
account for the relative importance of each assessment factor. For each option, the
weight of each assessment factor (all factors inclusive should sum to one) is multiplied by
the ability for that option to meet that factor resulting in an assessment score. The sum of
the assessment scores of all of the factors is the effectiveness score for that option. The
estimated cost is also calculated for each option.

5.2.4.1 Inputs
Table 5.5 illustrates each option’s assessment (i.e., ability to meet the assessment
factor, weight and cost). The values in the weight column were determined based on the
assumed importance of the assessment factors and their technical complexity. For
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example, it is very probable that for this example, the defended area coverage against a
specific threat is the most important factor to meet the objectives of the program. Thus, it
has a weight of 0.30. The values for the four option’s ability to meet these factors were
determined at random for the purpose of this example. It is conceivable though that these
values could be very similar to that of a typical BCA assessment. A BCA will also
evaluate the schedule for each option, but for this example, all options will have the same
schedule. Cost estimating techniques as previously defined are used in typical BCA’s as
inputs but for this example. A plus or minus 20 percent standard deviation will be used
to address the cost estimating uncertainty. This uncertainty will be addressed using
Monte Carlo Simulation.

Table 5.5, BCA (Four Companies Example) Input
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5.2.4.2 Logic
Based on the BCA guidelines (U.S. Department of Defense 2011b and 2007b), the
assessment score for each factor is defined as the product of the weight of the factor and
the ability to meet that factor. The effectiveness factor for the option is the sum of these
assessment scores. Each option is compared based on the effectiveness factor and the
cost of the option as shown in Table 5.6.

5.2.4.3 Results
For a typical BCA, the decision maker has at his/her disposal a report that
highlights or summarizes the analysis conducted by the BCA team of experts. Each
option is compared with another from a cost, schedule duration, risk of each measure, and
effectiveness metric. The decision maker uses this information to subjectively make a
decision. Table 5.6 was used to calculate the chart in Figure 5.3. Typically the decision
maker will read the report but more than likely will rely on a briefing or an executive
summary and the use of tables (e.g., Table 5.6) or charts (e.g., Figure 5.3) and a
recommended position from the BCA team lead to make the decision. Based on the
results shown in Figure 5.3, it is apparent that options 3 or 4 are preferred to options 1
and 2. Typically the decision maker would choose between options 3 and 4 based on
other subjective factors.
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Table 5.6 BCA (Four Companies Example) Results
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Figure 5.3, BCA (Four Companies Example) Results

5.2.5 Tailored value-centric requirements verification methodology
The VCRVM defined in the previous chapters focused on deciding between two
options (analysis or test) as a function of cost, benefits, consequences, results (pass, fail,
flawed results, and rework), and uncertainty. This example takes a similar approach in
that is uses the BCA data to address similar factors and uncertainty. The inclusion of
value in the decision making approach is not new (see discussion in Chapter 2), but the
uniqueness of this tailored VCRVM is its use in DoD decision making.
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5.2.5.1 Inputs
Table 5.7 shows the inputs used in the value-centric methodology. As can be
seen, the same data set used in the BCA for cost and factor uncertainty was used in this
methodology. Additionally, certain assumptions were needed to address the pertinent
methodology inputs of benefits and consequences.

Table 5.7 Tailored VCRVM Input (Four Companies Example)



Benefit. Benefits, as previously defined, are based on the objectives of the
program or product. In this example, six assessment factors are important in
achieving the objectives of the program. The benefits are then calculated based
on what the objectives would provide, if they were successfully met. Using
147

equation (4.6), the benefits are calculated by summing the technical
characteristics, the programmatic characteristics, and the political characteristics.
For this example, the benefits are separated into technical characteristics and
programmatic characteristics. The political characteristics were not included in
the benefit calculations due to the simplicity of the example but could be derived
by determining the effect of establishing a defensive capability (e.g., political
support for future funding, less oversight and the expenditures required to answer
requests).
The technical characteristics associated with the objectives of this program
are factors A through D, defended area coverage against a specific threat,
production rate compliance, reliability, and mission assurance. These, if
successfully achieved, will provide a defensive capability and achieve the
objectives of the program (i.e., fielding a missile defense system to protect a
medium size city against a specific threat). That capability can be measured and
calculated quantitatively. Assuming that the defensive capability is the defense of
a medium size city, the benefit can be calculated based on the expected lives the
program would save if it were deployed to defend a medium size city. This
calculation of the technical characteristic portion of the benefit is based on the
Environmental Protection Agency’s estimate of $7.4 million per Life as indicated
on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s website. It is assumed that 40
percent of the population (417,000 people) survives if a rogue missile were to be
launched against such a city. It is estimated that 250,200 deaths would occur at
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$7.4 million per person equates to a total benefit of $1.85 trillion by having this
product in the field protecting a mid-size city. The infrastructure cost is small
compared to the life estimate so it is assumed that the cost is covered under the
$1.85 trillion. This benefit is a result of meeting all of the technical assessment
factors that are attributed to the defense of the city (e.g., defended area coverage,
reliability, production rate, and mission assurance).
The programmatic characteristics in this example are those characteristics
that are important in achieving the objectives of the program but are not
necessarily essential to meeting the technical objectives of the program, (i.e.,
defending a medium sized city). These characteristics are commonality with
similar systems and data rights. The benefits for these are calculated based on
one or both of these factors being met. Commonality with similar systems
implies that the contractor is designing the product with the mindset that the
technology, subsystems or parts, interfaces, processes, and procedures could be
used to interface with or enhance future programs. The execution of this mindset
in the design and development of the missile yields benefits. These benefits are in
the form of a cost savings for future procurements and programs. For this
example, it is assumed that this cost savings could be 20 percent of the option’s
total cost. For example, for option 1, the additional benefit gained would be 20
percent of $350 million or $70 million.
The other program characteristic, data rights, is calculated the same way.
The term data rights implies that the Government will obtain the documentation
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and drawings (i.e., the design data package) to build the system in-house or to
provide that data package to another contractor. The benefits associated with the
Government obtaining the data rights of a product can be viewed in terms of more
control and insight into the design, and less cost for future procurements. For
example, if the Government obtains the data rights of a software package or a
seeker design, the design packages for those items can be provided to other
vendors for future procurements and reducing total life cycle cost. In addition,
obtaining the data rights to certain items enable the Government program office
personnel the insight needed to adequately understand and influence the
development of the products with less effort (i.e., cost). For this example, it is
assumed that the benefits (i.e., cost savings) associated with the Government
obtaining data rights is 25 percent of the cost of the option. For example, for
option 1, the additional benefit gained would be 25 percent of $350 million or
$87.5million.
Thus, the benefit is calculated, per equation (4.6) as the sum of the
programmatic characteristics and the technical characteristics which equate to
$1.85 x 1012.


Consequences. Consequences as defined in this dissertation are the negative
results of fielding bad products. As applied to this example, however, the
definition is altered a little. Consequences, as applicable to this example, are the
negative results of not achieving one or more programmatic characteristics (e.g.,
commonality with similar systems and data rights). These two assessment factors
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are important in achieving the objectives of the program, but are not essential to
meeting the technical objectives of the program (i.e., defending a medium sized
city). In other words, each assessment factor has a specific benefit if that factor is
met and a specific consequence, if that factor is not met. For this example,
assessment factors A through D all contribute to the objectives of the program
(i.e., defending a medium sized city) and thus will yield benefits, as previously
stated. Assessment factors E and F are important, and if met will also contribute
to the objectives of the program and yield benefits, as previously stated.
However, in terms of the consequences, if none of the assessment factors (i.e., A
through E) are met, the program is not developed and obviously not fielded and
thus will not have any benefits. Zero benefits also applies if assessment factors A
through D are not met since they all contribute to the defense of a medium sized
city. For example, if the assessment factor, production rate compliance, is not
met, the system will not be able to be fielded since not enough missile systems are
manufactured.
For assessment factors E and F, while they are important to the objectives
of the program, they do not necessarily contribute to the defense of a medium size
city. As stated in the benefits section, the benefits of meeting factors E and F are
20 percent and 25 percent of the cost of the option, respectively. If one or both
are not met, either the benefits for these are not included in the overall benefit
calculation or the value calculation is decremented by the applicable amount, as
shown in Table 5.6. This example reflects the latter to make the point that for
some circumstances, an assessment factor could partially contribute to the
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technical objectives of the program. In other words, if a specific technical
parameter quantity (e.g., reliability of 0.90) is deemed an assessment factor and
not met, and all other factors are met, the system may still be fielded, but at a
lower reliability. This would incur costs in terms of additional maintenance
actions, repairs, and system monitoring. These costs would be part of the
consequences. The inclusion of the logic into this methodology for partially
meeting specific assessment factors (e.g., reliability of 0.90) and still field a
system is left for future research.

5.2.5.2 Logic
Since the VCRVM is based on an inclusion of all of those things that impact and
are impacted by a decision (Table 5.7), a model is developed incorporating all of these
characteristics. The model is constructed very similar to the model developed for the
battery example. Each assessment factor has a probability of being met and a
corresponding probability of not being met. Since all of the six factors are significant in
meeting the objectives of the program, these are addressed in sequence yielding 64
outcomes (26(factors)). For example, factor A is met, factor B is not met, factor C is met,
and so on. Each sequence will have a probability and an outcome that yields a value.
Defining a value is also similar to equation (4.7). For this example, value is defined as:

V = C + Q + B,

(5.1)
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where C is the cost (negative value) of the option, Q is the consequence (negative value)
of not meeting one or more of the factors, and B is the benefit (positive value) of meeting
the factors.
The probability for each outcome is calculated based on the sequence of events an
outcome can take. For example, for option 1, an outcome where all factors are met,
except factor A, it will have a probability that is the product of the probability of factor A
not being met and the probabilities of all other factors being met. Thus, the probability of
each outcome is derived by the following equation.

Poutcome =

(5.2)

where f is the factor, P (factor f result) is the probability associated with either the factor
being met or not, and n is the number of factors being assessed.
Therefore, based on equations (5.1) and (5.2), the value and the probability of
each of the 64 outcomes possible are calculated. For example, for option 1:


Outcome 1, all factors are met.
Voutcome 1 = (C = -$350M) + (Q= 0) + (B = $1.85T) = $1.85 X 1012.
Poutcome 1 = (Pfactor A = 0.85) * (Pfactor B = 0.8) * (Pfactor C = 0.8) *
(Pfactor D = 0.85) * (Pfactor E = .6) * (Pfactor F = 0.5) = 0.1387.
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Outcome 2, all factors are met, except factor A.
Voutcome 2 = (C = -$350M) + (Q= 0) + (B = 0) = -$350 X 10 6.
Poutcome 2 = (Pfactor A = 1 - 0.85) * (Pfactor B = 0.8) * (Pfactor C = 0.8) *
(Pfactor D = 0.85) * (Pfactor E = 0.6) * (Pfactor F = 0.5) = 0.02448.
The rest of the outcomes are calculated the same way for all options. As with the

battery example, the expected value is calculated using equation (4.7) for each of the
options as well.
E (V) =

.

E (V) option 1 = ($1.85 x 10 12)*(0.1387) + (-$350 X 10 6)*(0.02448)* . . .
E (V) option 1 = $ 0.855 X 10 12.
As previously stated, the uncertainty surrounding the cost, benefits, and
consequence estimates can be addressed using stochastic tools. In this example, a Monte
Carlo simulation was conducted using 1000 Monte Carlo runs varying the costs and
consequences (plus or minus 20 percent) and the benefits (plus or minus 10 percent). A
triangular distribution was used for these variables.

5.2.5.3 Results
Table 5.8 provides the results of this tailored methodology and is illustrated in
Figure 5.3. For simplicity, the expected value for all options is divided by 1,000,000.
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Option 1 has the lowest expected value even though it is the least expensive of the
options. This is due to the fact that option 1, for the most part, has lower probabilities
(i.e., probability of meeting the factor) as compared to the other options. Option 2, the
second-to-least expensive has a higher expected value than that of option 1, with a higher
cost. This is expected since most of the probabilities for option 2 are greater. Option 3 is
interesting in that the expected value is higher than either option 1 or 2, at a higher cost,
even though the probabilities are not all greater (i.e., assessment factors A through D),
especially between options 2 and 3. As a reminder, assessment factors A through D, if
not met, will not yield any benefits (i.e., system will not be fielded). Thus, the value
calculated for the outcomes for these assessment factors, when they are not met, will be
negative (e.g., only the cost of the option), with the cost of option 3 being higher. Option
3 however, has a very high probability (i.e., assessment factor A) compared to option 2
and the assessment factors, where the consequences could affect the outcome (assessment
factors E and F), are also much higher. Option 4 has the highest cost but as shown in
Table 5.8, it also has the highest probabilities. Figure 5.4 provides a graphical
representation of the data illustrating the distribution of the different options based on the
uncertainty associated with the estimates used. As can be clearly seen, option 4 is the
preferred option.
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Table 5.8 Tailored VCRVM Results (Four Companies Example)

Figure 5.4 Tailored VCRVM (Four Companies Example)
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5.2.6 Comparison
The use of the BCA methodology resulted in two of the four options as the most
preferred (Figure 5.3). These two options (options 3 and 4) have comparable costs and
comparable effectiveness factors. For the decision maker, would it be worth spending
$10 Million to get a 0.0125 extra effectiveness (effectiveness factor 4minus effectiveness
factor 3)? What would be the best value for the Government? The decision maker is
faced with results that are not well defined and the decision is based on his/her subjective
interpretation and judgment.
The use of the tailored VCRVM resulted in a set of distributions that clearly and
definitely defines the preferred or highest expected value option (i.e., option 4) as
depicted in Figure 5.4. This concise answer is not just based on cost as a function of a
weighting scheme, but it is based on an incorporation of those attributes (e.g.,
consequences, benefits, cost, and uncertainty) that have an impact on the decision. These
attributes add robustness to the decision and provides an added comfort to the decision
maker that all attributes that impact the decision are being addressed.

5.3 Summary
The BCA methodology used in the DoD has its merits. It’s a simple and easy to
use methodology that provides quick results that can be used by decision makers in
situations where a timely decision is warranted. By simple and easy to use methodology,
it is meant to address the method in which the data is gathered and how the results are
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calculated, not the actual evaluation and assessment of the options and the assessment
factors. These can be very time consuming. The results of a BCA, however, can
sometimes leads to ambiguity, as can be seen in the second example. These results
provide the decision maker with vague and incomplete information to adequately make a
decision. The tailored VCRVM takes into account additional information (e.g.,
probability of outcomes, benefits, and consequences) that is useful in the evaluation of
different options as well as provides the decision maker a complete and discrete answer,
as illustrated in Figure 5.4. While this dissertation and the methodology herein do not
advocate substituting the current DoD decision making methods with the VCRVM, it is
clear, at least in this example, that using the latter will enhance the decision making
process and provide the decision maker with supporting information that will help
him/her make better informed decisions.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cost and schedule considerations are at the forefront of designers and decision
makers when requirement verification plans are developed. The main reason is that very
costly or long duration plans are more than likely not going to be approved and therefore
not executed. Other factors such as the future cost of the program if the verification is
successful, the benefits in terms of deterrence, the consequences of passing a bad product,
and the overall value of decisions made in terms of utilizing an analysis approach versus
a test approach are not necessarily considered. Typical verification plans do not
incorporate these factors or their respective uncertainties. Developing a methodology,
such as the VCRVM defined in this dissertation, with a broad view of the variables,
factors, and uncertainties that affect the product’s requirement verification will provide
decision makers a very significant alternative that can be used to yield the most
appropriate (highest value) verification strategy for their Program.
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6.1 Conclusions
The two verification approaches explored in this dissertation were the analysis
and the test approach. These are very dissimilar in terms of cost and schedule. An
analysis may take days to weeks to plan and conduct while a test can take from weeks to
months. The costs are also in the two extremes depending on the type of testing. An
analysis may cost 100 to 200 hours of effort equating to a cost in the tens of thousands of
dollars while a test can cost in the hundred-thousand’s or higher. At first glance,
conducting an analysis, rather than a test, to verify that a product meets the requirements,
if one has a choice, is very simple; choose the less costly and quicker option. At the end
of the day, using an analysis approach to verify requirements will save money and
schedule. However, what does passing the analysis mean and how much does it really
cost?
A review of the research literature indicates that in the DoD, as well as in the
NASA, the guidance and regulatory documentation for these are silent when addressing
requirement verification in terms of deciding between a test approach or a analysis
approach for certain requirements that have a choice (e.g., verification by analysis or by
testing). The DoD does provide guidance in terms of decision making methodologies
that could be used to address the verification approach selection, but this guidance does
not specifically tie this decision making guidance to requirement verification decisions.
This guidance also does not take into account critical attributes that affect the outcome of
the decision, such as possible outcomes, benefits if the product is successful,
consequences if it is not, and uncertainty.
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Decision making methodologies are not only applicable to the DoD and as such,
the research literature indicated that in the Pharmaceutical and Oil and Gas industries,
various methods are used to make decisions. While a consistent method is not prevalent
throughout these industries, stochastic and economic tools are used successfully along
with subject matter expert’s opinions and the decision maker’s subjective assessment.
Some of these methods (e.g., discounted cash flow analysis) are used in the DoD, but
mostly to address economic decisions.
Other requirement verification methodologies have been developed and are
appropriate for certain situations. These take advantage, for the most part, of
optimization techniques to maximize different attributes (e.g., cost and quality). While
these optimization techniques are valid, they do not incorporate all of the attributes that
impact and are impacted by a decision. One methodology that has a lot of merit and was
used to develop the VCRVM is the value-centric methodology. The value-centric
methodology addresses the value of a product by incorporating those things that affects it
(e.g., cost, environment) and it affects (e.g., other products, environment) to yield a
comprehensive assessment of the product’s value versus another.
The VCRVM defined in this dissertation provides an overall expected value for
each verification approach incorporating the cost of the approach, the possible benefits
incurred if the verification is successful, the consequences, in terms of cost, if the
verification passes a bad product, and the rework costs for each of the possible outcomes
that may be available. The VCRVM includes the uncertainty associated with each
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possible outcome as well as acknowledges and includes the uncertainty in estimating
costs and benefits.
The application of the VCRVM logic addressed in chapter 4 to the two examples
in chapter 5 illustrates that it can adequately incorporate the variables associated with
requirement verification plans (e.g., rework, flawed outcomes) that are not necessarily
taken into account in current verification decisions. In addition, tailoring the VCRVM to
a common DoD decision making assessment yielded positive results in terms of a
comprehensive and specific preferred option over a typical DoD decision making
method.
Two important outcomes from this dissertation need to be addressed. First is that
the VCRVM will enhance the decision maker’s ability to make decisions about his/her
verification plan using a wide set of attributes that affect the program rather than only
using a subset, such as cost and schedule. Decision makers should be armed with
adequate tools and as much information that is available to make informed decisions.
The VCRVM is one method that can assist decision makers make better informed
decisions. The second is that the VCRVM can also be applied to a wide variety of
complex decisions that could provide a better defined solution as depicted in the example
in chapter 5. By tailoring the VCRVM to the specific situation, a more comprehensive
set of information can be assembled to provide the decision maker additional insight.
The DoD should endorse the value-centric methodology referenced in the literature and
methodologies such as the VCRVM not just in requirement verification planning and
development but as a complement to the current policy and guidelines used to make
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decisions, such as analysis of alternatives, business case analysis, trade studies, and the
like.

6.2 Recommendations for Future Research
The term value is inherent in the choices individuals make. Knowing what drives
and what will drive those choices is not often considered and thus the value-centric
philosophy is an important philosophy to understand and apply. As such, pursuing future
research in this field could yield very beneficial results. The following are
recommendations for additional research opportunities:


One example is to expand this value-centric methodology to include verification
of a product to multiple requirements rather than one at a time. The VCRVM was
developed with the mindset of verifying requirements sequentially (i.e.,
transportation vibration and then hot temperature). Expanding the VCRVM to
verify requirements in parallel (e.g., transportation vibration at hot temperature)
will provide an added complexity to the methodology but will address those
situations where combined requirements are required.



The VCRVM development only took into consideration those requirements that
have a choice (e.g., test or analysis). Additional research and modification of the
VCRVM to include all requirements will provide a more comprehensive
assessment of the verification strategy.

163



The VCRVM only addressed one post verification scenario when a good product
passes. That is, the product will be integrated into a higher level system, fielded,
operated and yield benefits. The incorporation of uncertainty in the post
verification activities will enhance the methodology. In other words, a probability
can be calculated for one or more scenarios (e.g., probability of failing higher
level assembly, probability of higher level assembly failing in the field) that
include the post verification activities.



The VCRVM assumes an assessment factor is met or not in the logic, specifically
when addressing the second example in chapter 5. The addition of a partially met
logic (i.e., percentage of the assessment factor is met like reliability) in the
tailored VCRVM would also enhance the methodology.



The approach used after a rework was assumed to be the same every time. While
this situation is feasible, there may be times where changing the verification
approach may be a better choice. For example, the product fails a requirement by
analysis. After it is reworked, the decision maker may opt to verify the product
by testing instead.

The inclusion of these recommendations in the VCRVM will enhance the product
that the decision maker uses to make decisions. Adding additional fidelity in the
VCRVM will allow the decision maker to make better informed decisions.
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